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ABSTRACT
This Article critically examines the interrelationship between
substantive copyright protections and the remedies available for
infringement. Drawing from constitutional remedies scholarship and
poststructural theories of performativity, it argues that a court’s
awareness of the likely remedy award in a particular dispute
—combined with its normative view of how future actors should
address similar disputes—“reaches back” and shapes the determination of the parties’ respective rights.
Copyright scholars have long sought to limit the availability of
injunctive relief, and several recent court decisions have adopted this
reform. For example, in Salinger v. Colting the Second Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction against a critical reinterpretation of
The Catcher in the Rye, setting forth a new preliminary injunction
standard that expressly requires a court to consider the First
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Amendment interests of the parties and the public. In the same
opinion, however, the court in a single paragraph affirmed “in the
interest of judicial economy” the district court’s widely derided
rejection of Fredrik Colting’s fair use defense. This Article suggests
that this was no coincidence. It demonstrates that limits on available
remedies have the potential to lead to the expansion of substantive
rights, further entrenching dominant interests within the copyright
system under the guise of protecting free speech and expression.
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INTRODUCTION
In declaring that a “statutory right to exclude” is “distinct from
the provision of remedies for violations of that right,” the Supreme
Court revealed and further entrenched a rights/remedy problem in
copyright law.1 By viewing remedies principally as a means of
addressing the real-world consequences of a predicate rights
violation, this distinction overlooks the role of remedies in establishing and shaping substantive rights. Although the interplay between
rights and remedies has been well explored in constitutional law,2
and scholars in other areas of private law have grappled with the
rights/remedy distinction,3 intellectual property scholarship has, for
the most part, lacked critical insight into the relationship between
“the creation of a right” and the “provision of remedies.”4 This
Article (1) shows how the conventional framing of copyright remedies overlooks the interrelationship between rights and remedies
and (2) develops a “performative” theory of remedies to explain how
limitations on remedies in the name of the First Amendment might
actually serve to reinforce rights-holder dominance within the
copyright system.
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (vacating permanent
injunction in patent case and stating that its “approach is consistent with our treatment of
injunctions under the Copyright Act”); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-93).
As this Article will show, by suggesting there is a rights/remedy problem, I do not mean
that copyright law lacks effective remedies for violations of its statutory rights. See, e.g., Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1489 (1987) (“It therefore
seems evident that at least in some cases, blanket government immunity from liability
conflicts with the Constitution’s structural principle of full remedies for violations of legal
rights against government.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991) (“When, if
ever, does the Constitution require particular remedies for constitutional violations? Must
there be an effective remedy for every such violation—and if so, what, exactly, does ‘effective’
mean in this setting?”).
2. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87 (1999); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199.
3. See, e.g., H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or a Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting
Rights and Remedies Run Amok, 10 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301 (2005) (focusing on
Internet law); Stephen A. Smith, The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is Restitution a
Right or a Remedy?, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1037 (2003) (describing unjust enrichment law).
4. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.
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Many copyright scholars have invoked the First Amendment5 and
related concepts6 to rein in both the substantive and remedial
dimensions of copyright. In response to widely perceived overreach
by industrial copyright holders, these scholars have put forth
competing normative visions of our copyright system that would
push back against the steady accretion of rights and limit the consequences of infringement through a scaled-back remedial regime.
For example, even if a particular use of a copyrighted work is not
sufficiently “transformative” to be considered fair use, a court could
deny the copyright holder’s request to enjoin the distribution of the
infringing work and ensure the public’s access to a socially valuable
good.7
Although efforts to rein in the “substantive” expansions of
copyright—the unlawfulness of a wider range of activities for a
longer period of time—have been largely unsuccessful,8 remedy
reform efforts in recent years have proven remarkably fruitful.9 In
5. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891
(2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright
and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983
(1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, at xvi (2004) (“free culture”);
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 193 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (“semiotic democracy”); Jed
Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002)
(“freedom of imagination”).
7. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 5, at 1030.
8. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892-94 (2012) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which restored copyright
protection to certain foreign works that had entered the public domain); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2001) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to Copyright Term
Extension Act); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]raditional First
Amendment safeguards such as fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy are sufficient to
vindicate the speech interests affected.”), cert. denied sub nom. Kahle v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct.
958 (2008); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2003) (“First
Amendment concerns in copyright cases are subsumed within the fair use inquiry.... [I]f the
use ... is not fair use, there are no First Amendment prohibitions against granting a
preliminary injunction.”); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir.
2003) (“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair use defense.”).
9. Seemingly successful opposition to the Stop Online Privacy Act—a statute that would
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2006, the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange prohibited
categorical rules entitling a patent owner to an injunction,10 and the
Second Circuit in Salinger v. Colting extended eBay to copyright.11
In the wake of Salinger, eBay, and other appellate decisions
adopting their approach,12 copyright’s remedial structure has shifted
away from the reflexive issuance of preliminary and permanent
injunctions13 toward a more rigorous analysis of the various interests impacted by the requested relief.14 Increasingly, the question of
widely expand the “remedies” available for infringement but purports not to expand the
“substantive” reach of copyright—is perhaps another example of this trend. See H.R. 3261,
112th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2011) (“Nothing in title I shall be construed to enlarge or diminish
liability, including vicarious or contributory liability, for any cause of action available under
title 17, United States Code, including any limitations on liability under such title.”).
10. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
11. 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010).
12. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that it was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm and affirming
denial of preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1713 (2012); Flexible Lifeline Sys.,
Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating preliminary injunction
against use of plaintiff’s drawings in Air Force contract bids where district court relied on
presumption of irreparable harm); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532,
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief because
there was a threat to continuing copyright infringement).
13. Although the focus of this Article is on the trend toward limiting injunctive relief as
opposed to potential limitations on damages awards, I suspect that many of its insights—in
particular the inverse relationship between the breadth of rights and the scope of available
remedies—apply in large measure to monetary relief. Scholars have argued that the prospect
of exorbitant statutory damages, like the prospect of an injunction, chills the use of and
engagement with copyrighted works, and they have accordingly sought a clawback in
available monetary damages. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory
Damages to Promote Speech, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 16-18 (2010) (noting how high statutory
damages discourages use of copyrighted works); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland,
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
439 (2009) (discussing excessive damage awards and arguing for reform). To the extent that
such a clawback would lessen the perceived consequences of an infringement finding, for the
reasons explored in Part III, the lowered “costs” of such a finding may lead a court to
comfortably find infringement where it previously might have hesitated. The issue of
exorbitant statutory damages awards and potential due process limits has also been the
subject of several notable recent decisions. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660
F.3d 487, 488-90 (1st Cir. 2011) (reinstating $675,000 damages award and remanding for
consideration of common law remitter), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001 (D. Minn. 2011) (reducing a $1.5 million jury
award to $54,000).
14. This trend is not, of course, universal. Eric Goldman has tracked a number of district
court orders that have issued extremely broad injunctions covering numerous third-party
search engines and domain name registries. See Venkat Balasubramani & Eric Goldman,
Egregious/Overreaching Ex Parte Orders for Rightsowners Keep Coming—Deckers and
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injunctive relief no longer collapses into a mere determination of
likely success on the merits but instead requires a structured, sequential consideration of the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, irreparable harm, balance of hardships, and the public interest.15 As a
result, several copyright scholars have celebrated the eBay and
Salinger standards as ways to counteract some of copyright’s most
flagrant First Amendment abuses.16
Salinger demonstrates, however, the risks of advancing remedy
reform while paying little attention to the relationship between the
determinations of rights and remedies. Although the Second Circuit
expressly championed eBay as providing a First Amendmentsensitive standard for injunctive relief, it nonetheless breezily approved the district court’s highly derided17 conclusion that the novel
60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye was not a fair use of
Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye.18 Notwithstanding 60 Years
Later’s deeply critical commentary on both Holden Caulfield—who
appeared as a seventy-six-year-old—and Salinger himself—who also
Richemont, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 17, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/two_more_ex_par.htm, and cases cited/cross-posted therein.
These injunctions have generally been issued ex parte with the defendant in default.
15. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“[P]laintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”); see also Winter v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”).
16. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye:
Freeing First Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional View, 2 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 99, 152-54 (2011) (celebrating Salinger and eBay as advancing free speech
interests in copyright injunctions); Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access:
Intellectual Property and the Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 233
(2010) (citing eBay as a move toward more communitarian understanding of intellectual
property); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 715, 757-58 (2011) (citing Salinger as part of “growing judicial skepticism toward
copyright holder rights”).
17. See, e.g., Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 16, at 155 (opining that the Second
Circuit erred in upholding the district court’s determination that the fair use defense would
likely fail); Kate O’Neill, The Content of Their Characters: J.D. Salinger, Holden Caulfield,
Fredrik Colting, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291, 318-19 (2012) (criticizing district court’s
interpretation of Colting’s novel).
18. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
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appeared in the novel19—the Second Circuit affirmed the rejection
of fair use in a single paragraph.20 The consequences of being
deemed an infringer may be mitigated through the Salinger approach, but Salinger itself substantially increases the number of
individuals potentially deemed infringers for critically reinterpreting copyrighted works. After Salinger, rights holders may not be
able to obtain a quick and easy injunction against such uses, but
they may be able to effect the same outcome with a demand for
compensation and/or the threat of money damages.21 Indeed, shortly
after the Second Circuit’s ruling, Colting agreed not to distribute 60
Years Later in the United States.22
The Salinger and eBay decisions’ underlying assumption about
the ontological independence of rights—and the derivativeness of
the remedial determination from those rights—obscures the role of
remedies in the production of “substantive” entitlements.23 When
viewed in isolation from its discussion of fair use, the Salinger
court’s discussion of injunctive relief appears to be an unqualified
check against copyright overreach. When the two portions are
viewed together, however, the heightened injunction standard
appears to have reformulated the overall calculus of adjudicating
both remedies and rights. Vacating the injunction seemingly
renders the fair use analysis less consequential, in turn allowing the
court to both champion the First Amendment interests in accessing
Colting’s book and strongly signal to the Salinger estate that it
would be entitled to compensation.24 The Salinger standard may be
celebrated as a First Amendment safeguard, but the litigation
19. See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 303-04.
20. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
21. See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 340-42.
22. See, e.g., Andrew Albanese, J.D. Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright
Suit, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/
industry-news/publisher-news/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-settlecopyright-suit.html.
23. The notion that the merits determination is “substantive” indicates that the
infringement/rights/merits determination exists on its own. See RENÉ DESCARTES, PRINCIPLES
OF PHILOSOPHY 23 (Valentine Rogers Miller & Reese P. Miller trans., D. Reidel Publ’g Co.
1984) (1644) (“By ‘substance’, we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in
such a way that it needs no other thing in order to exist.”). I accordingly refer to the
substance/procedure and rights/remedies binaries for the sake of convenience only and
without any fealty to their conceptual underpinnings.
24. See Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 16, at 154.
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nonetheless resulted in a copyright holder successfully blocking the
U.S. distribution of a largely original work. The court’s rhetoric
expresses sensitivity toward free speech interests—and its new fourpart test appears much fairer than automatically enjoining
infringing works—but the decision itself does little to dislodge the
permissions-based norms that prompted remedy reforms in the first
place.25
Part I of this Article will document the remarkable consensus
within copyright scholarship about the need to scale back injunctive
relief. It will first review a long line of scholarship seeking a more
explicit role for the First Amendment in copyright law. This
scholarship has repeatedly advocated a heightened standard, or
unavailability, of injunctive relief as a last line of defense to ensure
public access to creative expression that is nonetheless deemed
infringing.26 It will then briefly survey similar law and economics
proposals to shift from a property rule—with readily available
injunctive relief—to a liability rule—with an expectation of
monetary relief—in order to lower transaction costs and facilitate
transparent, efficient bargaining.27
Part II will argue that these lines of copyright scholarship have
largely adopted an “essentialist” view of remedies, whereby a
determination of rights precedes and thus is unaffected by the
determination of remedies that appears to occur later in time.
Although copyright scholarship has largely overlooked the ways in
which the scope of available remedies may be inversely related to
the scope of substantive protections, this interplay has been
explored in other legal contexts. Constitutional law scholars have
pointed out that narrowing the remedies available for a violation of
a constitutional right—for example, through the doctrines of
qualified immunity and nonretroactivity—effectively “lowers the
cost” of constitutional innovation, allowing courts to expand the
scope of constitutional protections without needing to deplete
government coffers or set free large numbers of inmates. Although
this dynamic may lead to more robust civil liberties in the constitu25. See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 340-41 (discussing how the decision “expand[ed]
copyright’s scope as an exclusive property right”).
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. See infra Part I.B.
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tional context, in the copyright context, the narrowed scope of
remedies can serve to lower the cost of the further expansion of
copyright. If the whole point of narrowing the availability of injunctive relief is to push back against copyright overreach and protect
First Amendment interests, the lesser consequences of a court concluding that a particular use is infringing would seem to undermine
this effort.
Part III will build upon the remedies scholarship in Part II and
set forth a “performative” approach to remedies. In the same way
that speech can be performative by producing the phenomenon it
names,28 a remedy is performative to the extent it shapes the right
it implements. Although remedies scholarship provides a useful
taxonomy of the various ways rights and remedies may interact, it
lacks the conceptual tools to expose the normative thrust behind a
particular rights/remedy configuration. Poststructural theories of
performativity, however, can illustrate how a court’s normative
preference for the ultimate outcome of a particular dispute—and
similar future disputes—“reaches back” and sets into motion a
decision-making process designed to justify those normative ends.
Although rights appear to come “before” and remedies “after,” copyright protections only come into existence through their iteration in
a particular remedy, and the linear sequencing of copyright litigation masks the ontological significance of the remedial determination. Remedies may be curtailed ostensibly to protect downstream
First Amendment interests, but cordoning off the rights determination allows status quo industrial norms to remain intact, albeit with
a new veneer of fairness.
Part IV will then survey judicial decisions that have embraced the
essentialist approach to remedies in the process of limiting injunctive relief. As with the scholarship surveyed in Part I, these courts
conceptualize remedies as distinct from rights and temporally posit
the question of remedies after the determination of respective
rights.29 By employing these conceptual and temporal distinctions,

28. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4-11 (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 136-41 (1969). For example, a
court’s pronouncement that a defendant is “guilty” or that a couple is “man and wife” produces
the convict and married couple, respectively, it is addressing.
29. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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several courts have “split the baby” by ruling in favor of the rights
holder at the merits stage but then switching direction and ruling
in favor of the defendant at the remedies stage.30
Applying the insights from remedies and performativity scholarship, Part V will explain why the split-the-baby approach is a
problem. Although the shift away from strong property-like protection for copyright holders has some clear benefits for those
entities regularly litigating copyright issues, for those operating
more in the “shadow” of copyright law—individual authors, artists,
documentary filmmakers, and nonprofits—the emergent split-thebaby liability rule materially expands the specter of infringement.
For these individuals and entities, the threat of damages may be
just as likely to chill their speech and expression as the threat of an
injunction, and the expansion of substantive protections gives
copyright holders firmer ground to target noncommercial uses, for
example through takedown notices under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). To the extent that remedy reform has
sprung from normative desires for a more populist, speech-protective copyright system, this dynamic should be cause for concern. It
is particularly concerning given that this expansion of substantive
copyright protections is not a product of careful, deliberate thought
or even of political debate, but instead stems from courts ostensibly
giving each party to a copyright lawsuit a little bit of what it wants,
regardless of the collateral, precedential consequences to third
parties or the public at large.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that eBay and Salinger
erred in raising the bar for preliminary and permanent injunctions,
or that the eBay standard represents a complete overhaul of copyright injunction. In many cases, the continued availability of statutory damages can deter a court from embracing an unboundedly
hawkish approach to copyright enforcement,31 and there are many
circumstances in which a copyrighted work is unquestionably
infringed but an injunction should nonetheless not lie, such as the
infringement of architectural works32 or widespread integration into
30. See infra Part IV.C.
31. See Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 16, at 154.
32. See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007)
(interpreting eBay to prohibit a presumption of irreparable harm); Allora, L.L.C. v.
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derivative works.33 Nevertheless, in complex, novel, or close
cases—or where the alleged infringer can easily absorb a damages
award—courts should be aware that, even though the denial of an
injunction may mitigate the consequences of infringement, the
corresponding expansion of the copyright entitlement may be to the
detriment of a large number of individuals infrequently able to
assert their defenses in court.
More broadly, this Article seeks to raise questions about the
potential ideological commitments embedded in the remedies
determination and to push back against the assumption that remedies can be neatly divorced from the normative underpinnings of
substantive entitlements. Remedies play an integral part in the
shaping of rights, and overlooking this function risks further entrenching the norms embedded in both. The eBay standard perhaps
has gained traction not because it furthers the First Amendment
concerns of copyright scholarship but instead because it is an
effective vehicle for dominant interests to appear more “proximally
just” while expanding and entrenching control over speech and
expression.
I. REMEDY REFORM PROPOSALS
Scholars and advocates have long sought both substantive and
remedial limits on the reach of copyright law. Numerous scholars
have argued that the steady expansion in the scope of substantive
copyright protection—including term extensions, the DMCA, and
contractions in fair use—has stretched well beyond its mandate to
promote the progress of useful arts and sciences. Moreover, the
near-automatic availability of injunctive relief plus substantial
money damages has given copyright holders the potential power to
shut down cutting-edge web services, block the deployment of new
technologies, and delay the release of a book or motion picture.
Many scholars have proposed a substantially scaled-back remedial
Brownstone, Inc., No. 1:07CV87, 2007 WL 1246448, at *5, *8 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2007)
(declining to presume irreparable harm following a prima facie showing of copyright
infringement).
33. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing that an
injunction “would cause a great injustice” to the owners of the derivative film), aff'd sub nom.
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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regime, including substantial limitations on injunctive relief. This
Part will first look at remedy reform proposals that have developed
in response to First Amendment concerns with copyright injunctions
and then turn to law and economics proposals to limit injunctive
relief as part of an overall shift from a property to a liability rule.
A. First Amendment Approaches: Remedies as Procedural
Safeguards
For decades, copyright scholars have put forward a variety of
proposals for limiting the availability of injunctive relief in order to
better ease the tensions between copyright law and the First
Amendment.34 A fairly consistent theme throughout, however, is a
conceptual and temporal distinction between the determination of
rights—including copyrightability, duration, and infringement—and
remedies available for infringement.
In his seminal 1970 article Copyright and the First Amendment,
Paul Goldstein argued that copyright outlawed socially valuable
speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment, both in its
statutory monopoly and in its delegation of quasi-censorship powers
to the content industries.35 To better accommodate constitutional
values of free speech, he proposed two “accommodative principles”
that distinguish between the rights adjudication and the determination of available remedies.36 The first accommodative principle
would excuse infringement when the challenged use furthers the
public interest.37 The second accommodative principle would require, among other things, “that actual damages be demonstrated
by the plaintiff, and that the granting of legal, not equitable, relief
be the general rule when the plaintiff prevails.”38 Goldstein observed
that “recourse to injunctive relief in copyright cases is not uncom34. For proposals to limit injunctive relief in addition to those discussed herein, see Floyd
Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 3, 12 (1987);
James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 983, 994-96 (1990); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B][1][b][i] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012) (discussing the modern trend
toward limiting injunctions).
35. Goldstein, supra note 5.
36. Id. at 988.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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mon, and it is in the administration of this remedy that copyright
doctrine departs most notably from the requirements of the second
accommodative principle.”39
In a similarly influential article two decades later, Judge Pierre
Leval set forth a powerful critique of the then-dominant approaches
to the fair use defense, which placed insufficient value on the
“transformative” works that since have become central to the
doctrine’s protections.40 Although the bulk of Judge Leval’s efforts
focused on the scope of infringement as circumscribed by the fair
use defense, his proposals viewed the injunctive-relief inquiry as an
additional backstop for many of the same public interests.41 He
observed that “[o]ne of the most unfortunate tendencies in the law
surrounding fair use is the notion that rejection of a fair use defense
necessarily implicates the grant of an injunction.”42 In arguing that
the presumption of irreparable harm was improper in cases
presenting a colorable fair use defense, Leval lamented that “[l]egal
rhetoric has dulled thought on the injunction remedy.”43 He continued:
Historians, biographers, critics, scholars, and journalists
regularly quote from copyrighted matter to make points essential to their instructive undertakings. Whether their takings will
pass the fair use test is difficult to predict. It depends on widely
varying perceptions held by different judges. Yet there may be
a strong public interest in the publication of the secondary work.
And the copyright owner’s interest may be adequately protected
by an award of damages for whatever infringement is found.44

In order to acknowledge and properly accommodate all these
potential interests, Leval proposed that “[w]hen a court rejects a fair
use defense, it should deal with the issue of the appropriate remedy
39. Id. at 1033. Portending doctrinal developments to come, Goldstein’s article “implicitly
endorses a scheme of compulsory licensing.” Id. at 1034.
40. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990);
see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Leval, supra, at
1111).
41. Leval, supra note 40, at 1132-35.
42. Id. at 1130-31.
43. Id. at 1132.
44. Id.
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on its merits. The court should grant or deny the injunction for
reasons, and not simply as a mechanical reflex to a finding of
infringement.”45 Accordingly, to adequately vindicate the interests
served by the fair use inquiry, Leval advocated a sequential
approach that first looks to the merits of the fair use defense itself
and then afterwards limits injunctive relief for the close cases that
nonetheless slip through to the remedies stage.46
Although seemingly advocating a two-stage, sequential approach
to the infringement and remedies questions, Leval hinted at the
interrelationship between the availability of injunctive relief and
the scope of the substantive copyright entitlement. He suggested
that “the tendency toward the automatic injunction can harm the
interests of plaintiff copyright owners” because “[c]ourts may instinctively shy away from a justified finding of infringement if they
perceive an unjustified injunction as the inevitable consequence.”47
In a revealing footnote, Judge Leval admitted that “[a]n example of
such confusion, I confess, may be my own opinion in Salinger [v.
Random House, Inc.]. With hindsight, I suspect my belief that the
book should not be enjoined made me too disposed to find fair use
where some of the quotations had little fair use justification.”48 This
reciprocal relationship between narrow right and broad remedy,
apparently leading to an initial finding of fair use in the earlier
Salinger case, presaged an inversion of that relationship in the
Second Circuit’s Salinger decision nearly a generation later.49
The next major wave of proposals came at the turn of the millennium following controversial copyright-protectionist laws such as
the DMCA50 and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA).51 These legal developments, combined with the proliferation of digital media, gave rise to a robust body of scholarship
45. Id. at 1133 (footnote omitted).
46. See id. at 1133-34.
47. Id. at 1131.
48. Id. at 1131 n.114; see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding fair use in publication of Salinger’s unpublished personal letters in
an unauthorized biography of the author), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). As in the later
Salinger decision, Leval, in retrospect, would have denied both fair use and injunctive relief.
See Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 167, 179 (1989).
49. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating an injunction but denying
fair use defense).
50. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
51. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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questioning the priorities of our copyright system and seeking to
better align copyright with the transformed cultural landscape of
the digital age.52 Although the nature and full extent of these
proposals are far beyond the scope of this Article, the issues of
remedies generally—and injunctive relief specifically—have figured
prominently in this scholarship. For example, in developing a
limitation on copyright based upon the “freedom of imagination,”
Jed Rubenfeld argued that “the First Amendment requires special
remedy rules for copyright holders’ derivative works rights and
performance rights.”53 If an alleged infringement is “not a reproduction but a derivative work, neither an injunction nor damages
should be available,” and the remedy should be limited to an
allocation of defendant’s profits.54 Similarly, Neil Netanel argued
that the First Amendment requires modification of the fair use
doctrine through (1) giving greater weight to the defendant’s critical
expression and purpose, (2) shifting some of the burden of proof to
the plaintiff, and (3) “where the defendant presents a colorable but
unsuccessful claim of fair use, [courts should generally] award
damages in the amount of a reasonable license fee instead of
enjoining the use.”55
In a much-cited article from this era, Mark Lemley and Eugene
Volokh called for the application of the First Amendment’s prior
restraint doctrine to copyright preliminary injunctions.56 Drawing
from the general prohibition on enjoining the dissemination of
speech before a full adjudication on the merits, Lemley and Volokh
argued that “preliminary injunctions should ... generally be
prohibited in cases involving nonliteral copying.”57 They noted that
52. Prominent examples include: YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006);
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996); LESSIG, supra note 6; JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
53. Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 57-58.
54. Id. at 55; see also Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair
Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513 (1999) (arguing that both injunctive relief and fair use
should be unavailable for derivative works and that the remedy should be limited to a pro rata
accounting of profits and actual damages); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright?
Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV.
1201 (proposing that transformative uses be subject only to an accounting of profits, not
damages or injunctive relief).
55. Netanel, supra note 5, at 83-84.
56. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5.
57. Id. at 210.
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plaintiffs traditionally needed to satisfy a four-factor test in order
to obtain a preliminary injunction but that the “ostensibly fourfactor test collapses, in virtually all circuits, to a simple inquiry into
likelihood of success on the merits.”58 Courts presume the existence
of irreparable harm, the balance of equities “virtually always”
weighs in favor of the copyright plaintiff, and it is “virtually axiomatic” that the public interest favors upholding copyright protections through granting preliminary injunctions.59 Largely
because the preliminary injunction inquiry presumes irreparable
harm, effectively ends at the determination of likely success on the
merits, and does not actually proceed to the two additional steps, it
burdens a considerable amount of speech that is protected by the
First Amendment and might not be infringing.
Even though a preliminary injunction inquiry seemingly addresses the question of infringement at the same time that it
addresses whether to grant a provisional remedy, Lemley and
Volokh’s article suggests that there nonetheless remains a distinction between the merits/likelihood of success determination and the
analysis of whether additional considerations entitle plaintiff to the
requested relief. The major vice of copyright preliminary injunctions
observed by Lemley and Volokh—that they lack remedial safeguards following a finding of infringement60—closely mirrors the
earlier concerns of Goldstein and Leval that courts mechanically
issue injunctions without giving proper attention to the questions
of remedy that are supposed to chronologically follow a finding of
infringement.
Although the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft
significantly dampened hopes for robust First Amendment scrutiny
of substantive copyright protection,61 the Court’s decision three
years later in eBay v. MercExchange recently has considerably
fueled the prospect of integrating First Amendment-related
safeguards into the determination of remedies.62 Drawing from
58. Id. at 158-59 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 161-62.
60. Id. at 197.
61. 537 U.S. 186, 187-88 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension
Act). Such hopes were likely further dampened by the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to
provide First Amendment scrutiny to section 104A of the Copyright Act. See Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873, 883, 889-92 (2012).
62. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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eBay’s prohibition of categorical rules favoring patent injunctions,
Pamela Samuelson and Krzysztof Bebenek argue that a presumption of irreparable harm in copyright preliminary injunction cases
“undermines the constitutional values of U.S. copyright law when
applied to transformative works, such as clips of songs or movies in
documentary films or in user-generated content.”63 They argue that
the presumption “may cause courts to enjoin a use without careful
reflection” and that “[r]equiring plaintiffs to prove that they will be
irreparably harmed offers an important procedural safeguard
against unreasonable restraints on free expression interests of
follow-on creators.”64 Several scholars have cited eBay for the proposition that, in close fair use cases in which the court ultimately
determines that the use is infringing, issuing an injunction may be
“an improper abridgement of speech.”65
In another recent article, Orit Fischman Afori expressly proposes
a flexible, nuanced approach to remedies as a way of reshaping the
contours of copyright law.66 Afori advocates a “cure” theory of
remedies under which “remedies are not simply an automatic
response to the analysis of the right, but rather a second stage of
legal theory to be discussed in order to best achieve the legal effect,
after the first stage of the right’s relevant discussion has been
exhausted.”67 At this later remedy stage, courts can develop a
“comprehensive ‘cure’ doctrine that would ease some of the basic
problems of copyright law.... Courts could first conclude that an
infringement occurred, and at the remedies stage conclude that no
damages (or only reduced damages) are warranted.”68 Accordingly,
63. Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 67, 80 (2010).
64. Id. at 89.
65. Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 397, 421 (2007); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 1030 (2007) (“[E]ven when the harm caused by the defendant’s
use requires compensation, the social value of the defendant’s use should weigh heavily in a
court’s decision on whether to grant an injunction.”); John M. Newman, Note, Raising the Bar
and the Public Interest: On Prior Restraints, “Traditional Contours,” and Constitutionalizing
Preliminary Injunctions in Copyright Law, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 323, 344-45 (2011).
66. Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2011).
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 24.
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subjecting a request for injunctive relief to eBay’s four-factor test
would help better advance free speech interests, promote competition, and ensure greater public access to creative works.69
Again, what emerges from both older and recent proposals is a
descriptive and normative distinction between the adjudication of
the merits and the determination of the remedy. Copyright scholars
may see a role for the First Amendment at every point along the
adjudicative timeline, but under all of these proposals, the First
Amendment would be incorporated uniquely and independently into
each stage of litigation. First Amendment scrutiny of the copyright
term or the fair use doctrine is not expressly contingent upon
increased sensitivity to free speech interests in the determination
of injunctive relief; the remedy reforms can be adopted piecemeal,
regardless of the court’s view on the question of infringement. For
example, Eldred’s rejection of the First Amendment challenge to the
CTEA may seem to point in a different direction than the heightened standard for injunctive relief in eBay, but this distinction
between rights and remedies has pervaded over forty years of
copyright scholarship. As the following Parts will illustrate, the
scholarship surveyed above has proven influential on the development of copyright injunction standards, persuading courts to devote,
or in my view shift, a significant amount of intellectual energy to
the remedy determination. In the process, a largely unquestioned
rights/remedy distinction has become embedded into copyright law
in a manner that risks undermining the free speech commitments
motivating much of the scholarship above.
B. Law and Economics Approaches: From Property Rule Æ
Liability Rule
Some law and economics-minded copyright scholars have also
argued for a shift away from injunctive relief,70 but through a very
69. Id. at 29-33.
70. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 943-45 (2007) (“If the rights-holder could demand only a
compensatory licensing fee, its ability to hijack the defendant’s entire production process
would disappear ... go[ing] a long way toward curtailing the unnecessary licensing that fuels
doctrinal feedback.”); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (arguing that a liability rule helps prevent
strategic holdup behavior by entitlement holders); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability

1142

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1123

different methodological and conceptual framework from the
scholars in the previous Section. Unlike much of the scholarship
above, law and economics literature tracing back to Calabresi—the
author of Salinger v. Colting—and Melamed has recognized the
functional interrelationship between a substantive entitlement and
the remedy available for enforcing that entitlement.71 Rather than
focus on how a particular entitlement does or does not further some
normative policy goal, the main question is more often which type
of remedy—for example, an injunction or damages—would best
facilitate transactions in a particular sector.72 Generally, in the
presence of low transaction costs, parties are able to bargain efficiently towards a mutually beneficial outcome, and a property rule’s
promise of injunctive relief helps crystallize each side’s initial
bargaining position.73 On the other hand, if transaction costs are
Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008) (arguing that
liability rules reduce incentives to engage in inefficient informational searches). Law and
economics literature does not universally accept the shift away from strong property-like
protections, however. See, e.g., David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2011); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 361-63 (1989) (discussing the
ideal term of a copyright).
71. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see Gibson, supra
note 70, at 944-45.
72. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3 (2005) (assuming that “the policymaker has
chosen a particular scope and duration” and “some insights as to the advantages and
disadvantages of different possible rules for the private enforcement of these rights in court”);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and
Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 608 (2008) (“Almost all the literature
on the Calabresi-Melamed model has come to view it as focusing almost entirely on the issue
of remedies.”); cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1295-97 (2008) (arguing that a liability rule might resolve much of the tension between
the First Amendment and copyright depending on “how much weight to accord” defendants’
First Amendment interests).
A notable exception is Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1573-75 (1993),
who argues that a shift toward a liability rule would better protect free speech interests.
Additionally, although Calabresi and Melamed’s model is best known for its taxonomy of
remedial options, they do mention considerations for initial entitlement allocations, such as
efficiency, distributional preferences, and “[o]ther [j]ustice [r]easons.” Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 71, at 1093-1105.
73. See, e.g., David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy,
65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 330-31 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79
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high, parties may be unable to reach an optimal outcome through
private negotiations, and a liability rule ensures that socially
beneficial transactions occur by limiting relief to monetary damages.
Because copyright transactions often involve a substantial degree
of legal uncertainty, strategic holdup behavior, and informational
deficiencies, a liability rule limiting plaintiffs to monetary relief
would seem appropriate in many cases.74
Unlike scholars working more expressly in a First Amendment
vein, law and economics-minded scholars have more expressly
acknowledged that a shift from a property rule to a liability rule
might alter a court’s approach to determining the copyright holder’s
substantive entitlement. As James Gibson has observed, “[O]nce
courts no longer confront the all-or-nothing choice that a property
rule imposes, they will be more inclined to ‘split the baby’ and order
moderate licensing fees in cases that the defendant would once have
won outright.”75 In response to the Ninth Circuit’s controversial
ruling upholding a preliminary injunction in Dr. Seuss Enterprises
v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,76 Judge Alex Kozinski and Christopher
Newman expressly proposed a split-the-baby, liability rule compromise that would deny both fair use and injunctive relief to derivative works and only grant actual damages.77 Under this approach,
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729 (2004).
74. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 70, at 1297-98.
75. Gibson, supra note 70, at 945. Wendy Gordon has similarly intuited that “the switch
to monetary remedies [might] encourage a growth in pro-plaintiff doctrine (a growth that
hardly needs any more fertilizer).” Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On
Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 91 (2004).
76. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that an account of the O.J.
Simpson trial entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice was fair use of Dr.
Seuss’s well-known The Cat in the Hat and upholding the preliminary injunction). Several
scholars have criticized the merits of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller
& Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 979, 987-88 (2004) (“[D]istinguishing parody from satire requires aesthetic
and literary judgment that the copied work is not in any way a target of criticism, and, in
particular, it is far from clear that the Dr. Seuss court’s view was correct.”); Tyler T. Ochoa,
Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 546, 548 (1998).
77. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 54, at 526; see also Richard Dannay, Copyright
Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay—Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom, 55 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449, 459 (2008) (“For copyright owners, where fair use is a close
question—close enough that a court might reject a finding of infringement liability for fear
that an injunction might be too harsh but unavoidable—eBay may avoid the up-or-down risk
of the binary fair-use finding.” (footnote omitted)).
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“the question as to whether Dr. Juice was legitimately a parody of
Dr. Seuss would still arise, but it would arise as part of a determination of damages, rather than as the gatekeeper of liability.”78
By recognizing the importance of remedies in effectuating
substantive entitlements, whatever they may be, the CalabresiMelamed framework “effectively moves the emphasis in rightsanalysis towards remedies.”79 Although to a large extent this
framework eschews a sharp conceptual distinction between rights
and remedies, it does not eschew the chronological sequencing of
their respective determinations. As Shyamkrishna Balganesh has
observed, “The entitlement model involves two steps: in the first,
the legal system vests the entitlement in someone; in the second, it
adopts one of three rules to protect the entitlement so vested.
Calabresi and Melamed focus almost entirely on the second of these
steps—‘second order decisions.’”80 By focusing almost exclusively on
the second step of adjudication, the Calabresi-Melamed tradition
leaves largely unquestioned the norms and values embedded in the
initial entitlement determination, assigning to law a “principally
corrective” function.81 Even though this model acknowledges the
interrelationship of rights and remedies, it nonetheless shifts focus
away from the rights determination and embraces an adjudicative
sequence that leaves first-order decisions intact and unquestioned.82
As the following Parts will show, it is precisely this dynamic of
shifting intellectual engagement toward the determination of remedies, while apparently leaving “earlier” determinations of rights
unchecked, that can facilitate the covert expansion of substantive
copyright protections under the guise of liberalizing its remedial
structure.

78. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 54, at 528.
79. Balganesh, supra note 72, at 609.
80. Id. at 607.
81. Id. at 609; see also Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better
View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1997) (questioning whether the CalabresiMelamed taxonomy involved “guidance” or “enforcement” rules).
82. See, e.g., BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 72, at 1-6.
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II. THE RIGHTS/REMEDY RELATIONSHIP
Although the scholarship surveyed in the previous Section largely
frames remedies as the second step in a two-part sequence of rights
Æ remedies, there is a rich body of scholarship exploring a much
more dynamic interplay between the scope of substantive rights and
the scope of available remedies.83 Pushing back against the idea that
courts first determine the existence and violation of a particular
right and then use remedies to determine whether and how much
to vindicate that right, several scholars have demonstrated a much
more dynamic interplay between these seemingly distinct inquiries
that helps explain how the contraction of remedies can lead to the
expansion of substantive copyright entitlements.84
The conventional wisdom dating back to Marbury v. Madison has
been that there needs to be an available remedy in order to sufficiently vindicate a legal right: “[E]very right, when withheld, must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”85 In this view,
83. This discussion will focus primarily on constitutional law scholarship due to the
particular attention that has been given to the definition of the substantive constitutional
right articulated in a particular case. Although a substantial body of scholarship in the legal
realist tradition has focused on the rights/remedy relationship in tort, property, and contract
law, see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 71; Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-63 (1897), the “vaporized” boundaries between rights and remedies
in this body of scholarship have shifted attention away from the definition of the substantive
private law right or entitlement and toward a unified entitlement theory centered upon the
available remedy, see, e.g., Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2149 (1997). Given the consequences of the way
courts define infringement and fair use, see infra Part IV, it is important in the copyright
context not to gloss over the substantive entitlement in a way that private law remedies
scholarship can encourage and that the eBay/Salinger standard facilitates.
84. Important empirical research into judicial psychology and decision making has
similarly shown an interplay between threshold justiciability questions and later decisions
on the merits. See, e.g., Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability
of Preferences in Legal Decision Making, 68 J. POL. 308, 308 (2006) (demonstrating the
influence of judicial attitudes on abortion and free speech rights on standing decisions).
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“[W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.”); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838)
(“[T]he power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present
a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized
government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should
be shown to exist.”).
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a right is a “declaration” of a public value, and the remedy is its
“actualization.”86 The determination of the right occurs first in time,
in the abstract realm of the Platonic constitutional ideal, and
afterwards the court must face reality and craft a remedy that will
actually be implemented.87 This process will inevitably entail a
degree of “loss” or “deficiency” in the process of translating an
abstract injury into a “living truth.”88 Nonetheless, it remains
important in this rights/remedy framework to segregate these
determinations because judges have unique competency to operate
in the “realm of abstraction” as opposed to the “world of practical
reality,”89 and because there is a risk that instrumental concerns of
remedy crafting will infect the purity of the predicate right.90
Daryl Levinson has termed this view of the rights/remedy relationship as “rights essentialism.”91 This “two-step process of constitutional rights-construction” allows courts and commentators to
speak of a right in complete isolation from real-world concerns and
then “decide to scale it back or enhance it with remedial add-ons.”92
In line with a long history of legal theory criticizing this formal
distinction between rights and remedies,93 Levinson pushes back
86. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 52 (1979).
87. Id. (“Rights and remedies are but two phases of a single social process—of trying to
give meaning to our public values. Rights operate in the realm of abstraction, remedies in the
world of practical reality.”).
88. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (quoting Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958)); see Rudovsky, supra note 2, at 1199 (“[A]lthough
constitutional and statutory rights have generally been expanding since the historic Brown
v. Board of Education, federal remedies have not kept pace.”).
89. Fiss, supra note 86, at 52.
90. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 26-28 (1983) (“[R]ights and remedies are
utterly different legal phenomena—products of distinct reasoning processes employing
distinct sources, methodologies, and decision criteria. Conceptions of justice that deny this
disjunction are likely to be deeply flawed.”).
91. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999).
92. Id. at 924.
93. See, e.g., 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 765-68 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885) (“[I]t is impossible to extricate the
right of action itself from those subsidiary rights by which it is enforced.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (1991) (“Most
disputes over remedies in civil rights cases have nothing to do with remedies and everything
to do with substantive entitlements.”); Lon L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18 N.C. L. REV.
1, 4 n.5 (1939) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
1938)) (“Certainly the issue cannot be foreclosed by assuming a moral duty which sets its own
legal sanction, or by assuming a legal duty so tenacious of life that it continues to exist even
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strongly against this essentialist view and argues instead that
“rights and remedies are inextricably intertwined.”94 Structural
reform projects, such as school desegregation, prison condition
reform, and voter reapportionment, have all involved the articulation of constitutional rights with a close eye to the remedial
concerns of how those rights might actually be implemented.95 In
contrast to the essentialist view of causation as running only from
rights to remedies, these structural reform cases “illustrate the
importance of causation running in the opposite direction, from
remedies to rights.”96 Under Levinson’s theory of “remedial equilibration,” rights do not prefigure the remedial determination but instead
are “dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real
world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”97 Because the
rigid two-part sequencing of rights essentialism maintains the
“illusion” that rights are identified through some abstract reasoning
process, the “functional, fact-specific policy concerns” embedded in
the articulation of constitutional rights remain obscured.98
Copyright law and scholarship seem to understand the statutory
rights/remedy relationship in copyright law largely in essentialist
terms. Most explicitly, Justice Thomas’s insistence in eBay that “the
creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for
violations of that right” isolates rights from remedies in a manner
that denies the potential interdependency and symbiosis between
the two.99 Additionally, Judge Leval’s argument that “[w]hen a court
rejects a fair use defense, it should deal with the issue of the
appropriate remedy on its merits”100 mirrors Levinson’s observation
that the two-step approach to constitutional adjudication first
determines the existence of a right and then scales it back via a
limited remedy. Afori’s proposal to use flexible remedies as a
after courts have ceased to enforce it.”); Holmes, supra note 83, at 458.
94. Levinson, supra note 91, at 858.
95. Id. at 873-84.
96. Id. at 884.
97. Id. at 858.
98. Id. at 857.
99. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Compare id., with Fiss,
supra note 86, at 52 (“[A right] can exist without a remedy—the right to racial equality, to be
free of Jim Crowism, can exist even if the court gave no relief (other than the mere
declaration).”).
100. Leval, supra note 40, at 1133.
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“comprehensive ‘cure’ doctrine that would ease some of the basic
problems of copyright law”101 and Samuelson and Bebenek’s view of
the irreparable harm requirement as “an important procedural
safeguard against unreasonable restraints on free expression
interests”102 similarly echo this view of remedies as calibrating the
consequences of a rights declaration. Lastly, Kozinski and
Newman’s proposal to shift the question of whether a work is a
legitimate parody out of the liability determination and into the
determination of damages103 parallels the rights-essentialist move
to address messy policy questions at the remedies phase. Because
copyright law and much of its influential scholarship embody at
least a quasi-essentialist view of the relationship between statutory
rights and remedies, they are unable either to fully recognize the
rights/remedy interactions Levinson and others explore or, accordingly, to anticipate how limitations on injunctive relief could lead to
the expansion of substantive rights.
Levinson sets forth a useful taxonomy of ways in which remedial
concerns shape and define the articulation of a particular right,
illuminating the complexity and slipperiness of the rights/remedy
relationship. The first relationship is “remedial deterrence,” wherein
a “right may be shaped by the nature of the remedy that will follow
if the right is violated.... The defining feature is the threat of
undesirable remedial consequences motivating courts to construct
the right in such a way as to avoid those consequences.”104 For
example, it is unlikely that the Court would have recognized the
sweeping rights of Miranda v. Arizona if they applied retroactively
to every criminal defendant seeking postconviction review.105 The
second relationship is “remedial incorporation,” wherein some
prophylactic remedy is built into the definition of a right “[b]ecause
it would be too difficult or costly” to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether a particular circumstance triggered constitutional
concern.106 Rather than review every Fifth Amendment claim of selfincrimination for voluntariness, Miranda replaced such analysis
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Afori, supra note 66, at 24.
Samuelson & Bebenek, supra note 63, at 89.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
Levinson, supra note 91, at 884-85.
Id. at 889-90; see 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Levinson, supra note 91, at 887.
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with a warning requirement.107 The third relationship is “remedial
substantiation,” whereby “the practical value of a right is determined by its associated remedies.”108 Although Miranda set in place
a constitutional warning requirement, the Court later limited the
availability of the exclusion remedy—and accordingly the practical
value of the right to be given Miranda warnings—by “labeling
Miranda a subconstitutional prophylactic rule.”109
Intellectual property courts and scholars arguably have been
sensitive to the second and third relationships in Levinson’s taxonomy. Prior to eBay, patent holders were entitled almost as a matter
of right to an injunction upon demonstrating infringement, and the
Court’s distinction between the right to exclude and the remedy
available for a violation of that right disincorporated the injunctive
remedy in Levinson’s terminology.110 eBay also demonstrates sensitivity to the way automatic injunctions have enhanced the “practical
value” of the patent entitlement, and both the Court and scholars
have looked to scale back the arguably excessive value of an intellectual property right.111 eBay and Salinger would therefore seem to
“drive a wedge” between infringement and injunction in a way that
seemingly “desubstantiates” the right to exclude.
What these approaches seem to overlook, however, is “remedial
deterrence.”112 In this rights/remedy relationship, a court refrains
107. Id. at 901, 903.
108. Id. at 888.
109. Id. at 909.
110. Intellectual property holders regularly argue that injunctive relief is proper because
it would be too difficult or costly to calculate monetary damages, see eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting “the
difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies” (emphasis omitted)),
but eBay and its progeny require courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a
particular circumstance warrants the issuance of an injunction, id. at 393-94 (majority
opinion).
111. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 555, 557 (2010) (“If no remedy for a violation is provided, the right is illusory
for practical purposes. The stronger the remedy, the more valuable the right is to the right
holder.”). For example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay singles out nonpracticing
entities/patent trolls as an industry reliant upon the threat of an injunction to extract
supracompetitive licensing fees. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Several
scholars also have pointed to near-automatic copyright injunctions as giving rights holders
undue leverage over downstream uses of their works. See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note
70, at 784, 795.
112. Although copyright scholars for the most part have not grappled at length with
remedial deterrence, some work has been done on the manipulation of copyright law to avoid
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from finding the existence of a right in order to avoid imposing some
unjust or unworkable remedy.113 A good example might be Judge
Leval’s admission that he may have found fair use in the earlier
Salinger litigation out of discomfort with issuing an injunction.114
Inversely, a court denying a remedy is more likely to rule expansively on the question of whether a right exists. A good example
might be the Second Circuit’s later Salinger decision, which vacated
a preliminary injunction but upheld the district court’s charitable
finding of likely infringement.115 In short, “remedial deterrence”
accounts for the incentive to split the baby: if a court can rule for
defendants at the remedial stage and provide what appears to be
only limited relief, it can more comfortably rule expansively for
plaintiffs at the merits stage.
A number of constitutional scholars have embraced this potentially inverse, split-the-baby relationship between the scope of
available remedy and the breadth of constitutional rights as helping
to advance the development of constitutional rights. For example,
Miranda might not have happened without the doctrine of nonretroactivity,116 and Brown v. Board of Education might not have
happened if it had been accompanied by crippling financial penalties
to southern municipalities.117 John Jeffries accordingly has argued
that limitations on monetary damages for constitutional injuries,
such as through the doctrine of qualified immunity, “facilitate[ ]
what would be seen as harsh consequences of rigid application of copyright doctrine, for
example in the development of a taxonomy of general, limited, investive, and divestive
publication under the 1909 Copyright Act. See Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of
First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 605-10 (2011).
113. This reluctance to find infringement when the result is a broad set of remedies
perhaps suggests one reason that content industries have increasingly focused their efforts
on extrajudicial remedies, such as those made available under the proposed Stop Online
Privacy Act. See H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103(b) (2011) (requiring ad networks and payment
processors to stop serving infringing websites upon notice from the copyright holder).
114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
115. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
116. See Levinson, supra note 91, at 889-90; see also Jeffries, supra note 2, at 99 (“The
decision in Miranda depended, I think crucially, on the (now abandoned) doctrine of
nonretroactivity, which allowed the Court to give effect to new requirements only in future
applications.”); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV.
1, 29 (2002) (“Would Miranda have been decided as it was if the cost of the decision was the
granting of new trials to virtually every defendant in state and federal prison?”).
117. Jeffries, supra note 2, at 101 (“Might Brown have come out differently if the decision
had come with a huge pricetag?”); see 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2013]

COPYRIGHT ESSENTIALISM

1151

constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation.”118 Judges
are far more likely to recognize expansive new constitutional rights
for the benefit of future generations if the immediate impact on
existing actors is minimized.119 Sam Kamin agrees that in certain
circumstances the gap between rights and remedies can “de-ossify
constitutional law,”120 but argues that for this dynamic to work, the
“order matters.”121 Remedial limitations cannot lead to an expansion
of substantive rights if the court treats the limiting doctrine, such
as qualified immunity, harmless error, or nonretroactivity, as a
threshold question; instead, it must “consider the substance of a
litigant’s claim first.”122
Although embracing remedial limitations in the constitutional
context may be laudable to the extent they lead to the recognition
of a wider range of individual rights, the same dynamic of remedial
deterrence in the copyright context is potentially troubling. Scholars
118. Jeffries, supra note 2, at 90.
119. See id. at 105 (describing a “rolling reallocation of constitutional resources from older
to younger citizens”). Prominent criticisms of this view include Thomas Healey, The Rise of
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 928-35 (2005) (arguing that
unnecessary rulings on the merits are likely to retard the development of constitutional rights
because courts do not always rule for plaintiffs on the merits and plaintiffs have little
incentive to litigate nondispositive issues), and Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity
Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 702-08 (2009) (arguing that judges
are unlikely to issue split rulings due to attendant “cognitive dissonance”).
120. Kamin, supra note 116, at 39. Similarly, Ashutosh Bhagwat has advocated for
“remedial discretion” as a way of dealing with difficult constitutional disputes. Rather than
balancing the interests in recognizing a constitutional right against some particular
overriding social interest—resulting in jurisprudence full of ad hoc exceptions—Bhagwat has
proposed taking the resulting compromise out of the substance and into the procedure.
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L.
REV. 961, 1005-10 (1998). By keeping questions of compromise out of the question of rights
and using a flexible focus on remedies to balance competing social values, courts can firm up
core constitutional commitments. “The primary consequence of a greater focus on remedial
alternatives in hard cases is that hard cases will no longer generate quite as strong an
impetus for courts to define rights narrowly to avoid social costs.” Id. at 1009.
121. Kamin, supra note 116, at 39.
122. See id. at 38-39 (emphasis added); see also John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The
Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 403, 405-08 (1999) (arguing that courts should not always engage in “merits
bypasses” due to the important notice-giving potential of their technically unnecessary rulings
on the merits). Kamin accordingly embraced the Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001), which mandated this sequential approach to qualified immunity.
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s overruling of the case in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009),
has been questioned as stifling constitutional development. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing
the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 116-17, 132-36.
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and advocates have pushed for limitations on injunctive relief
primarily to vindicate the First Amendment interests of users and
consumers of copyrighted works; in the process, however, they may
have effectively lowered the costs of ruling broadly in favor of rights
holders at the merits determination. If a finding of infringement no
longer requires courts to block the release of a book, movie, or web
service, and the plaintiff is limited to court-determined monetary
relief, there are fewer disincentives to rule in the plaintiff’s favor on
the merits. The current trend toward limiting injunctive relief may
lower the practical value of any one exercise of the copyright
holder’s substantive entitlement, but it has the potential to expand
the reach of this entitlement to cover a broader range of potentially
infringing activities.123 The costs of a finding of infringement do not,
of course, drop to zero, as infringers still face the prospect of actual
or statutory damages.124 However, when the infringement question
is novel or difficult, when defendants have deep pockets, or when
the question of damages is not presently before the court—for
example, requests for preliminary injunctions—the lower costs may
tip the scales in favor of infringement.125
Notwithstanding its decision in eBay, the Supreme Court has
recognized in the qualified immunity context that resolving a case
on the basis of remedial issues—particularly in combination with a
mandatory decisional sequence—can lead to problematic analysis of
the merits. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court unanimously held
that lower courts addressing § 1983 claims no longer needed to
decide whether a violation of a constitutional right occurred before
123. Levinson briefly alludes to the “competing considerations of remedial deterrence and
remedial substantiation” and notes that “more than one form of remedial equilibration may
be in play at the same time.” Levinson, supra note 91, at 913. He further suggests that the
“odd political alignments” on the question of retroactivity reflect this interplay. Id.
124. Even when entitled to statutory damages, rights holders may nonetheless sacrifice an
extremely large damages award if it would deter a court from finding a substantive right. For
example, in Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rassett, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012), plaintiffs had
received a jury award of $222,000, $1,920,000, and $1,500,000, respectively, over the course
of three infringement trials. On appeal, plaintiffs sought, “for tactical reasons,” reinstatement
of the $222,000 award instead of the higher amounts. Id. at 902. In exchange, they sought a
ruling by the Eighth Circuit about the heavily-disputed issue of whether “making available”
a copyrighted work was a violation of the distribution right. Id. at 903 (noting district court
split).
125. See Bhagwat, supra note 120, at 1008-12 (arguing that flexibility in remedial
considerations allows courts to find the existence of a constitutional right in “hard cases”).
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deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.126
Instead, the decisional sequence now lies entirely within the
discretion of the court.127 One of the Court’s proffered reasons for
throwing out the mandatory sequencing it had put in place only
eight years earlier128 is particularly relevant:
Although the Saucier rule prescribes the sequence in which
the issues must be discussed by a court in its opinion, the rule
does not—and obviously cannot—specify the sequence in which
judges reach their conclusions in their own internal thought
processes. Thus, there will be cases in which a court will rather
quickly and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly
established law before turning to the more difficult question
whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at
all. In such situations, there is a risk that a court may not
devote as much care as it would in other circumstances to the
decision of the constitutional issue.129

Because the outcome of constitutional litigation often hinges upon
whether the law was clearly established at the pertinent time,
courts in such circumstances need not grapple extensively with the
merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, leading to “insufficiently thoughtful and cautious” rulings on constitutional rights.130
In the constitutional context, therefore, scholars and the Court have
acknowledged that the dynamics of remedial deterrence can lead to
poor decision making on the merits of a plaintiff’s constitutional
claims,131 but in the intellectual property context, scholars and the
126. 555 U.S. 223.
127. Id. at 236. In Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), the Court held that a
defendant who prevails on qualified immunity grounds may seek review of a finding of a
constitutional violation. Id. at 2028-33. Justices Kennedy and Thomas, dissenting, and Justice
Scalia, concurring, suggested that eventually “the Court might find it necessary to reconsider
its special permission that the Courts of Appeals may issue unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with binding precedential effect.” Id. at 2043 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The alternative solution ... is to
end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the
defendant possesses qualified immunity.”).
128. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
129. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239.
130. Id. at 239-40 (quoting Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999)).
131. This is not to say that in the constitutional law context courts have gotten it right and
settled upon the “correct” approach to adjudicating constitutional rights and remedies; it is
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Court nonetheless insist on the conceptual segregation of rights and
remedies.132
III. THE PERFORMATIVITY OF REMEDIES
Although constitutional remedies scholarship provides useful
tools—largely absent from copyright scholarship—for discussing the
rights/remedies interrelationship, it provides little guidance as to
why a particular combination is deployed in a particular case.133
Poststructural theories of performativity and temporality, however,
have the potential to link the chronological and conceptual interplay
between rights and remedies to deeper normative commitments of
copyright adjudication.
As explained above, the copyright field has largely overlooked the
last of Levinson’s rights/remedy relationships: “remedial deter-

instead to point out that the rights/remedies interplay has risen up much closer to the surface
in the constitutional context than it has in the intellectual property context. See also Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“While the Court gives lip service
to the principle, oft repeated in recent years, that ‘standing in no way depends on the merits
of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal,’ in fact the opinion ... can be
explained only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits.” (footnote and citation
omitted)).
132. For example, as support for its concern that mandatory sequencing would lead to
careless decision making, the Court cited to a 2006 article by Judge Leval that criticized the
“mischievous” sequencing rule set forth in Saucier. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234 (citing Pierre N.
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275, 1277
(2006)). In Leval’s formulation, Saucier required that “before dismissing the case on the
ground of good faith immunity, the court must first either gratuitously declare a new
constitutional right in dictum or decide that the claimed right does not exist.” Leval, supra,
at 1275-76. This decisional sequencing is bound to produce “bad constitutional law” because
“in many cases neither the judge nor the defendant has any practical interest in the
theoretical question of constitutionality. Both know it can have no effect on the inevitable
dismissal of the case. The court’s conclusion on this question will come at no price.” Id. at
1277-78 (footnote omitted). This concern stands in sharp relief to Leval’s proposal in the
copyright context to decouple a finding of infringement from the issuance of an injunction. See
supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
133. Levinson notes but does not delve into “the competing considerations of remedial
deterrence and remedial substantiation.” See Levinson, supra note 91, at 913. Such indeterminacy, however, is often at the heart of postmodern critique and opens up space for
political engagement at junctures seemingly foreclosed by essentialist accounts of a particular
phenomenon. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question
of “Postmodernism,” in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 3 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott
eds., 1992); Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 641, 655 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
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rence,” which both accounts for the “split-the-baby” dynamic discussed below under the eBay/Salinger standard and, not coincidentally, happens to be the most overtly countersequential in
Levinson’s taxonomy. A court’s awareness of the real-world future
consequences of its ruling on the merits—that is, its remedial
decision—influences that “earlier” merits ruling in a manner rendered invisible by the rights essentialists’ two-step process of
adjudication.134 An essentialist view of rights, whether in copyright
or constitutional law, has the potential to shield the pragmatism
and policy considerations at play in the articulation of rights, and
the unidirectional rights Æ remedies sequence “legitimate[s] and
protect[s]” not just the idealized status of rights but also the normative commitments behind them.135
There is something extremely provocative lurking within
Levinson’s critique of the rights/remedy split, his concern for the
opacity and disingenuity of substantive adjudication, and his turn
toward countersequentialism as a way of exposing the normative
underpinnings of a court’s decisions. Although largely couched in
the legal realist tradition, in arguing that remedies are not a mere
outgrowth of some preceding decision on the merits but instead
that the “after” shapes and defines that which happens “before,”
Levinson’s theory rejects the essentialism of rights and suggests the
“performativity” of remedies. A particular view of the eventual
outcome of a dispute—and a normative belief in how similar parties
should engage with one another in the future—sets in motion a
series of steps that lead to and justify the ultimate combination of
rights/remedies determinations.
A remedy is performative to the extent it brings into existence the
substantive right that appears to prefigure and legitimize it.136
Rather than a remedy being a court’s attempt at filtering an
idealized right through the pragmatics of real-world implementation, the court’s understanding of the law’s consequence produces a
134. See Levinson, supra note 91, at 924.
135. Id. at 857.
136. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 33 (1990) (“There is no gender identity behind
expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that
are said to be its results.”). In speech-act theory, language is performative more generally
when it enacts or produces that which it names. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 28, at 4-11;
JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC 1, 13-14 (1988); SEARLE, supra
note 28, at 136-41.
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right that can be implemented in accord with the court’s normative
sense of justice and fairness. In this sense, Levinson’s legal-realist
approach to remedies dovetails with queer and poststructural work
on performativity. Just as scholars such as Judith Butler push
against the distinction between a fixed material body and its
gendered social construction,137 Levinson questions the distinction
between a pure constitutional value and its translation into the
remedial apparatus.138 According to Butler, it is a “juridical conception” to culturally inscribe meaning on that which appears to
precede the social, political, and discursive, and the exercise of
“juridical power” requires the existence of some temporally preexisting phenomenon to will upon and bring into social being.139 The
later-occurring social apparatus produces, and does not merely
represent, that which appears to precede it temporally.140
Butler’s work on offensive speech is particularly instructive. In
determining that particular speech is unlawful, a court does not
simply identify that speech as being in some fundamental sense
offensive or obscene and then decide to deploy its remedial powers
in order to censor it.141 The adjudicative process may create the
appearance of some preexisting categories of low-value or unlawful
speech that are then censored, but the court is instead producing
offensiveness and obscenity—and, as a corollary, nonoffensiveness
and nonobscenity—through its power to censor.142 In a manner
closely aligned with Levinson’s theories of remedial equilibration,
the court shapes and defines freedom of speech through the
imposition of a particular remedy. The idea that censorship defines
speech, and that remedies define rights, inverts the “temporal
relation” commonly associated with the “conventional view” of adjudication.143 Through this temporal inversion, a court’s knowledge
137. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 1-5, 12 (1993).
138. Levinson, supra note 91, at 870-72 (describing Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between
rights and remedies in social constructivist terms).
139. BUTLER, supra note 136, at 5, 11.
140. Id. at 5; BUTLER, supra note 137, at 5 (“But this sex posited as prior to construction
will, by virtue of being posited, become the effect of that very positing.”).
141. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 128 (1997) (“In the conventional view, censorship
appears to follow the utterance of offensive speech: speech has already become offensive, and
then some recourse to a regulatory agency is made.”).
142. See BUTLER, supra note 137, at 10 (“[T]here is no reference to a pure body which is not
at the same time a further formation of that body.”).
143. BUTLER, supra note 141, at 128 (“Censorship precedes the text (by which I include
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of what it is going to do in the future—imprison a deliverer of hate
speech, desegregate schools, enjoin a book’s publication—reaches
“back” and teleologically lays the foundation for its future pronouncements.144 Viewed through the lens of performativity, the role
of remedies is not merely to modulate some preceding identification
of rights so as to enhance or diminish that right’s real-world impact,
but instead to shape rights in order to align with particular social
needs and normative beliefs of how disputes like the one at hand
should be resolved.
Performativity theory also brings to light the potential for
temporal sequencing to effectively reinforce normative preferences.
What comes first must be able to stand on its own and be described
in a manner that is independent of the description of some later
concept, and through this seeming independence, the first-in-time
becomes naturalized and normalized. Rights in an essentialist
framework can and must be articulated first-in-time as a matter
of principle, independent of remedial policy considerations.
Accordingly, questions of whether an individual has a right to
compensation or assistance of counsel or humane prison conditions
stand on their own, pure and untainted.145 What comes second to
this primary concept in turn becomes an extension, “exaggeration,”
or “diminution” of the normal course.146 The question of whether
‘speech’ and other cultural expressions), and is in some sense responsible for its production.”);
see also Ritu Birla, Performativity Between Logos and Nomos: Law, Temporality and the “NonEconomic Analysis of Power,” 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 95 (2011) (“Performativity plays
with temporality, and so with the very notion of context itself.”). Important studies of
temporality in this vein include LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE (2004); ELIZABETH FREEMAN, TIME
BINDS (2010); and ANNAMARIE JUGOSE, INCONSEQUENCE (2002).
144. See Madhavi Menon, Spurning Teleology in Venus and Adonis, 11 GLQ J. LESBIAN &
GAY STUD. 491, 492 (2005) (“[T]eleology depends on a sequence leading to an end that can
retrospectively be seen as having had a beginning.”). Carla Freccero has discussed the sense
of being a “future dead person writing [her]self out of time while time is running out.” Carolyn
Dinshaw et al., Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable Discussion, 13 GLQ J. LESBIAN
& GAY STUD. 177, 184 (2007). This concept is particularly provocative in the judicial context,
not just for its temporal inversion but also for the permanency and memorialization that
accompanies the issuance of a judicial opinion in our common law system. To the extent that
concerns with issuing a particular remedy influence the articulation of a right, an interesting
question is how a sense of legacy, with its associated fears and responsibilities, further
contributes to the future’s shaping of the past.
145. Levinson, supra note 91, at 871-72 (analyzing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 82-84, 90 (1977)).
146. Annamarie Jugose has shown how sequencing has been used in psychoanalytical
literature to shore up sexuality and gender hierarchies by positing “normal” adult
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someone is entitled to an injunction, to challenge the conditions of
her arrest postconviction, or to have a prison cell to herself are
merely second-order questions designed to effectuate the first-order
right at a certain level of robustness; they are inherently dependent
on, but by no means constitutive of, the earlier-identified right. This
account, however, denies the interrelatedness of the seemingly
earlier-identified right and its real-world implementation in the
form of a remedy award. By focusing intellectual energy primarily
on this apparently later-in-time real-world implementation, and
conceding at least to some degree the existence of a foundational
right to compensation, counsel, or humane prison conditions, we
shield the assumptions and beliefs that feed into those rights from
critique or meaningful engagement.147 If a denial of an injunction is
motivated by the belief that a liability rule adequately balances the
interests of the parties and the general public, this policy preference, as well as its potential drawbacks, feeds “backwards” into a
finding of infringement while remaining hidden by a forwardmoving linear sequence.148
Viewing rights as performatively constituted by their remedies
accordingly exposes the potential for a reshaping of remedies to
further ideologies at odds with the stated motivations for remedy
reform. As Butler notes, “[A] performative ‘works’ to the extent that
heterosexuality as first or primary and its aberrations—in the form of male and female
homosexuality, in that order—as developmental derivations from this norm. JUGOSE, supra
note 143, at 25-27. One particularly illuminating example concerns the publication of
Havelock Ellis’s monumental Studies in the Psychology of Sex. HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX (1905). Upon the publication of the first volume ready for print,
Sexual Inversion, Ellis noted that “[i]t was not my intention to publish a study of an abnormal
manifestation of the sexual instinct before discussing its normal manifestations.” JUGOSE,
supra note 143, at 25. In subsequent editions of Studies, however, the volumes were reordered
so that Sexual Inversion became Volume II, and Ellis “was pleased to be able to effect this
change of order.” Id. at 26.
147. See, e.g., JUDITH HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME AND PLACE 6-7 (2005) (“[B]ecause we
experience time as some form of natural progression, we fail to realize or notice its
construction.” (analyzing DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990))); Carol
J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J.
1631, 1636 (1989) (describing linear time as “time with a purpose” designed to resolve
tensions among potentially conflicting priorities); cf. BUTLER, supra note 137, at 11
(suggesting that the concession of materiality performatively materializes it).
148. See WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION
OF TIME 2-3 (2004) (arguing that temporal assumptions reflect particular social organizations
and that linearity is linked to industrial wage economies).
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it draws on and covers over the constitutive conventions by which it
is mobilized.”149 These “constitutive conventions” of the performative
—in other words, the normative commitments of the regulatory
scheme—are obfuscated primarily by the positing of some element—bodily “sex” for Butler, “rights” here—as preceding both language and social construction. If a particular concept is regularly and
repeatedly treated as existing independent of ideological, pragmatic,
and political consideration, it becomes entrenched as a foundational
concept unmarked by the messiness of interpretation and social
construction.150 The problem, though, is that the apparently foundational is actually constructed by that which appears to spring
forth from it and accordingly is inseparable from normative considerations. As Levinson has shown in the constitutional context,151
and as the cases surveyed in the next Section suggest in the
intellectual property context, rights determinations cannot be separated from remedial considerations, and the expressly pragmatic
considerations of the remedies determination give rise, at least to
some degree, to a declaration of a substantive right.
In some ways, the performativity of remedies is nothing new.
John Austin, for example, observed the following:
[I]t is perfectly clear that the law which gives the remedy, or
which determines the punishment, is the only one that is
absolutely necessary. For the remedy or punishment implies a
foregone injury, and a foregone injury implies that a primary
right or duty has been violated. And, further, the primary right
or duty owes its existence as such to the injunction or prohibition of certain acts, and to the remedy or punishment to be
applied in the event of disobedience.152

In other words, Austin in the nineteenth century, like Levinson in
the twentieth, recognized that rights and duties come into being
through the imposition of a particular remedy. The concept of
149. BUTLER, supra note 141, at 51.
150. BUTLER, supra note 136, at 189 (“If taken as the grounds of feminist theory or politics,
these ‘effects’ of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality are not only misdescribed
as foundations, but the signifying practices that enable this metaleptic misdescription remain
outside the purview of a feminist critique of gender relations.”).
151. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
152. 2 AUSTIN, supra note 93, at 767.
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performativity in the poststructural tradition, however, digs a layer
deeper into the remedial considerations stated by a court and
provides theoretical tools for unearthing ideological assumptions
potentially at odds with those presented on the surface. What may
appear to be—and what may be fully intended as—a vindication of
speech and expression rights may instead reflect a commitment to
market-oriented individualism at odds with the more communitarian ideals for which speech and expression often serve as
proxies.153 By refusing to take for granted even the most basic of
Western cultural assumptions—for example, linear time, male and
female sexes, individual autonomy—performativity and deconstructive theory expose key limitations on conventional legal reform
and demonstrate how such pursuits can reify some of the very
obstacles they confront.154 As a narrow slice of these broader legal
dynamics, the performativity of copyright remedies both problematizes the temporal and conceptual distinction between rights
and remedies in service of First Amendment values and provides a
normative, ideological dimension to the inherited observation that
remedies bring life to rights.
The following two Parts will (1) demonstrate the essentialist
moves made by courts in adopting the eBay standard and (2) apply
the theoretical insight of remedial and performative theories to
expose some of the potentially troubling aspects of this recent shift
in copyright law.

153. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 7 (2012) (“My goal in
this book is to focus critical attention on what the freedom/control binary leaves out. Upon
closer inspection, each vision of the information society has a hollow core. The self that is to
exercise expressive freedom, or to benefit from market abundance, remains a mere
abstraction.”); id. at 51 (“Dichotomies between commerce and speech, or between utopian bliss
and revolutionary struggle, are useful for expository purposes, but they can become crutches.
The two-dimensional models that they offer are too stark to capture the full range of human
motivations, choices, behaviors, and experiences, or the protean way in which one set of
motivations and behaviors can flow into another.”).
154. See generally WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY (1995) (discussing ways in which
social justice projects premised upon the vulnerability and victimhood of certain groups codify
such attributes in the legal treatment of members of those groups). I have observed other
iterations of this dynamic elsewhere. See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
83 (2008) (arguing, inter alia, that sex-stereotyping theories of transgender discrimination
essentialize gender binaries and perpetuate status quo understandings of norms and
deviancies).
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IV. RIGHTS ESSENTIALISM IN MOTION: THE REEMERGENCE OF THE
FOUR-FACTOR TEST
This Part will track the emergence of the eBay standard, its
extension to copyright law in Salinger, and the split-the-baby
dynamic that appears to have accompanied it. It will illustrate the
consistently essentialist approach to remedies these decisions take
and will demonstrate that the championing of the First Amendment
and related public interests has managed to accompany material
expansions of rights-holder entitlements.
A. eBay v. MercExchange
In eBay, the Court seized upon the distinctions between the
“creation of a right” and “the provision of remedies for violations of
that right” in order to allow equity to cabin some of the troubling
consequences of a finding of patent infringement.155 Drawing heavily
from its copyright jurisprudence,156 the Court replaced the Federal
Circuit’s “general rule ... that a permanent injunction will issue once
[patent] infringement and validity have been adjudged” with the
traditional four-part equitable test for a permanent injunction.157
Although the majority opinion remained silent as to the Court’s
underlying motivations, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
explicitly mentioned two problems with the current patent system

155. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
156. Id. at 392-93 (“And as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected
invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”). In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., even though the Court accepted 2 Live Crew’s fair use defense, it went
out of its way to embrace Judge Leval’s argument that “the goals of the copyright law, ‘to
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always best served by
automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the
bounds of fair use.” 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra note 40, at 1134). The
Court reiterated this concern in New York Times Co. v. Tasini. In finding the inclusion of
freelance articles in electronic databases infringing, the Court rejected arguments that its
conclusion would “punch gaping holes in the electronic record of history.” 533 U.S. 483, 504-05
(2001). It emphasized that “it hardly follows from today’s decision that an injunction against
the inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any
databases) must issue.” Id. at 505.
157. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94.
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that a more robust standard for injunctive relief might counter. He
pointed to (1) the emergence of an industry in “which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees”—in other words, patent
trolls—and (2) the “potential vagueness and suspect validity” of a
“burgeoning number” of business method patents.158 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, along with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
“The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent
Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological
and legal developments in the patent system.”159 The four-part
equitable test for injunctive relief would accordingly allow a court
to deny an injunction to a trolling nonpracticing entity or the holder
of a questionable business method patent, notwithstanding that
same court’s earlier ruling that the challenged conduct was infringing.
Numerous commentators have embraced eBay’s shift away from
a traditional property rule within the Calabresi-Melamed framework toward a liability rule.160 Less able to wield the threat of an
injunction, patent holders would have fewer incentives to engage in
strategic holdout behavior,161 leading to more efficient licensing
negotiations and likely lower licensing fees. eBay accordingly brings
considerably greater comfort that the breakdown or infeasibility of
advance negotiations will not endanger the ultimate rollout of a
financially lucrative and potentially socially valuable project.
Although eBay only specifically formalized a four-part test for
permanent injunctive relief in the context of patent law, it has
gradually expanded outside of patent law as well as into the
preliminary injunction context.162 The similarities between copy158. Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 397.
160. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 263-65 (2009);
Fischer, supra note 111, at 559-61; Jake Phillips, Note, eBay’s Effect on Copyright Injunctions:
When Property Rules Give Way to Liability Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 411-12, 416-19
(2009).
161. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 70, at 795-96; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027, 1045 (1995) (“The defendant’s ownership of the liability rule call option thus acts
as an upper bound on the ability of a low-valuing plaintiff to overstate her valuation.”).
162. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010),
the Court applied the eBay four-factor test to a claim under the National Environmental
Policy Act.
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right and patent—for example, both are rooted in Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution and balance public access versus private
incentives—make this extension conceptually unproblematic;163 but
for the reasons set forth below, the normative implications are
troubling. Because patent law is a purer strict liability regime than
copyright,164 there are fewer opportunities within the patent infringement analysis to incorporate public interest considerations
like those set forth in Justice Kennedy’s eBay concurrence; accordingly, the structure of patent law to a significant degree forces
courts to treat the question of infringement as foundational.165 In
copyright law, by contrast, the fair use inquiry incorporates public
interest considerations, and prima facie infringements that trigger
serious First Amendment concerns historically were not infringements at all.166 The eBay standard, when extended to copyright
disputes, allows courts to shift important public interest considerations out of the merits determination, easily find infringement, and
deal with the broader policy considerations while crafting the
appropriate remedy. Although copyright law, particularly through
the development of the fair use doctrine, does not mandate an
163. As David Bernstein and I have argued elsewhere, this extension to other areas of
intellectual property law—in particular trademark law—is problematic. See David H.
Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1038-39 (2009) (arguing that eBay should not eliminate the
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark law due to conceptual differences between
trademark law and patent and copyright law).
164. For example, patent law does not require actual copying like copyright law does. See
Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual
Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002) (“Perhaps the most basic difference between patents
and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and copyrights is that independent
invention is not a defence to infringement.”).
165. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 215, 256 (2012); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1196-98 (2000). There are some exceptions written into
the Patent Act, however, including the doctrine of patent misuse, limits on patentable subject
matter, and government use compulsory license. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006); 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 271(d) (2006). To the extent that the eBay standard shifts attention away from these
doctrines, many of the concerns expressed in this Article likely would apply.
166. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994) (finding
parodic reinterpretation of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman to be fair use); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-56 (1984) (finding time shifting of television
broadcasts to be fair use); see also Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 135 (2011) (arguing that fair use concerns were historically considered part of
the threshold question of whether a use was infringing, instead of incorporated into an
affirmative defense to infringement under current law).
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essentialist approach to rights, the eBay standard nonetheless
encourages courts to adopt an essentialist posture.
Moreover, at least as conceived by four Justices, the eBay
standard was developed with a particular eye to the inefficiencies of
the patent system and to curtail some of the well-publicized holdup
behavior by industrial patent owners.167 Although the copyright
system certainly presents opportunities for trolling and strategic
bargaining,168 a repeated concern with abuses in the copyright
system is the failure to adequately take into account the interests
in free speech and a robust public discourse.169 These are not necessarily concerns with efficiency but instead are ideological commitments to the importance of semiotic engagements not entirely
beholden to market dynamics.170 To the extent that this tension
between democracy and efficiency commitments is more pronounced
in copyright than in patent, efforts to harmonize the two areas of
law have the potential to inadequately protect the nonmarket-based
commitments so often prominent in copyright law and scholarship.
B. Salinger v. Colting
In Salinger v. Colting, the Second Circuit shifted from a preliminary injunction standard with a relatively fluid treatment of rights
and remedies toward a structured, sequential approach seemingly
mandated by eBay.171 Prior to its decision in Salinger, the Second
Circuit employed a “sliding-scale” approach to all preliminary injunctions under which courts in the circuit would consider and
balance several equitable considerations.172 The test in the Second
167. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1414
(2009).
168. See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 70, at 800-03.
169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 990-1009 (1978); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795
(“[T]he First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”).
171. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
172. Circuits have split over whether a sliding-scale approach to preliminary injunctions
remains valid after Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). The
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that Winter requires a consideration of the
four-part test and requires at least a likelihood of irreparable harm, but that it does not forbid
lower courts from balancing likelihood of success against the relative balance of harms. See
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011); Citigroup
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Circuit required plaintiffs to show “(a) irreparable harm and (b)
either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the
party requesting the preliminary relief.”173 Although copyright
plaintiffs ostensibly needed to satisfy this same test, a presumption
of irreparable harm upon a showing of likely success meant that the
Second Circuit “nearly always issued injunctions in copyright cases
as a matter of course upon a finding of likelihood of success on the
merits.”174 Injunctions may have been relatively common before
Salinger, but the presumption of irreparable harm nonetheless kept
the court’s inquiry focused on the substance of the plaintiff’s claims.
In Salinger, the Second Circuit determined that its previous
approach to copyright preliminary injunctions was inconsistent with
eBay and Winter.175 Because the district court had simply presumed
irreparable harm upon finding a likelihood of infringement, the
Salinger panel vacated the injunction and issued step-by-step
guidance on how district courts in the circuit should approach the
preliminary injunction inquiry. Under the first step, the plaintiff
must demonstrate “either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them
a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the [plaintiff]’s favor.”176 Under the second step, the
plaintiff must show “that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in
Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.
2010). The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, has interpreted Winter as setting forth a stricter fourpart test that requires plaintiffs to show entitlement under each criterion. See Real Truth
About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130
S. Ct. 2371 (2010). In her dissent in Winter, Justice Ginsburg stated that she did not believe
that the majority opinion rejected the sliding-scale standard used in several circuits. Winter,
555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (citations omitted).
174. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 76.
175. Id. at 76-79. In Winter, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s standard for preliminary
injunctions, particularly to the extent that it allowed preliminary injunctions to issue on a
mere showing of a possibility of irreparable harm. It held instead that “[a] plaintiff seeking
a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at
20.
176. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quoting NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476 (2004))
(alteration in original).
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the absence of an injunction.”177 Under the third step, “a court must
consider the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant.”178 Lastly, “the court must ensure that the ‘public interest
would not be disserved’ by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”179 This reformulated approach notably reorders the sequence
of the court’s previous standard, placing a determination of the
merits—whether there is a likelihood of success or existence of
serious questions—at step one and moving a determination of
irreparable harm “down” to step two. The legal rights of the parties
and the additional prerequisites to injunctive relief are considered
separately, and the determination of rights occurs first.180
Even though courts consider the merits of a copyright claim at
step one, the Salinger court mentioned the serious First Amendment issues at stake in a copyright preliminary injunction only at
steps two, three, and four. At steps two and three, courts must take
into account both the defendant’s “core First Amendment interest
in the freedom to express him or herself ” as well as the plaintiff’s
First Amendment interest in not speaking.181 Courts may not
presume the existence of irreparable harm after eBay, and, citing
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, the Salinger court noted that traditional equitable standards help courts “keep pace with innovation
in this rapidly changing technological area.”182 At step four, the
court stated that (1) “[t]he object of copyright law is to promote the
store of knowledge available to the public,” (2) “[t]he public’s
interest in free expression ... is significant and is distinct from the
parties’ speech interests,” and (3) “[e]very injunction issued before
a final adjudication on the merits risks enjoining speech protected
by the First Amendment.”183 The court noted that in the past it had

177. Id. at 80.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2005)).
180. Indeed, Judge Calabresi repeated eBay’s insistence that “the creation of a [statutory]
right [to exclude] is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.” Id. at
78 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 392) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. at 81. See O’Neill, supra note 17, for an extended critique of this declared right not
to speak.
182. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82.
183. Id.
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“rarely considered the public’s interest before deciding whether an
injunction should issue.”184
Given the Salinger court’s heightened standard for preliminary
injunctions and its repeated invocation of the First Amendment, the
decision would seem to represent a significant victory for those
seeking to better incorporate free speech considerations into
copyright law. Salinger materially narrows the availability of
injunctive relief in copyright cases, thereby effectuating the goal of
several decades of scholarship and advocacy. District courts in the
Second Circuit must now expressly take into consideration the free
speech interests of both the parties and the public at large before
enjoining an allegedly infringing work. A finding of likely infringement no longer necessitates the burning of books, the cancellation
of a television show, or the delay of a movie release. Speech may
disseminate or remain disseminated, the plaintiff may simply be
compensated through monetary relief, and the First Amendment
may proceed unoffended by this resolution.
Salinger may be, however, a pyrrhic victory for free speech
interests in copyright. Although extolling the importance of considering a variety of First Amendment interests at stake in a
copyright preliminary injunction, for the sake of “judicial economy”185 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s heavily criticized186 fair use analysis in a single paragraph.187 Despite Frederick
Colting’s “critical intervention” into the legacy of The Catcher in the
Rye,188 and despite fair use’s role as a “First Amendment safeguard[ ],”189 the Second Circuit sanctioned the district court’s analysis largely by deferring to its “credibility finding” that criticism was

184. Id. at 79 n.8.
185. Id. at 83.
186. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 898 (2010) (“The use of the
format of a sequel based on this iconic literary character allowed unique insights, which might
not have been achieved as effectively through more traditional forms of commentary or
criticism.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 701, 749-51 (2010); Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 16, at 123-34; Rebecca
Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2133, 2143-44 (2011).
187. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
188. Tushnet, supra note 186, at 2144.
189. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
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not actually Colting’s primary motive.190 The Salinger decision may
have expressly infused the remedial question with considerations of
the First Amendment and the public interest, but at the same time
the court seemed largely agnostic to how these same concerns factor
into the substantive copyright entitlement. Much as the CalabresiMelamed framework has largely assumed the existence of some
predicate entitlement and focused its energies on the question of
remedies,191 Judge Calabresi’s Salinger opinion made short shrift of
a difficult and important question of copyright infringement in the
process of championing steps two through four of the eBay/Winter
standard. Denying an injunction in Salinger allowed the court to
trumpet the First Amendment in its question of remedies, but its
sharp distinction between rights and remedies in effect collapsed
the speech/expression concerns at the heart of the case into the
question of whether a property rule or liability rule should govern
given a finding of infringement.
By laying out a step-by-step inquiry beginning with a determination of the merits and then proceeding to additional remedial
concerns, the eBay/Salinger standard places courts in a position in
which they opine on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim first,192 likely
fully aware that they are about to deny the plaintiff’s requested
relief. The Salinger approach may allow courts to champion the
First Amendment in the process of denying a particular remedy, but
the decisional sequence also allows them to expand the substantive
reach of copyright to demand compensation from a broader range of

190. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
191. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
192. The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the eBay approach in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
perhaps suggests that this sequencing is not set in stone and that courts might bypass the
merits altogether. See 653 F.3d 976, 982 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1713
(2012). The court in that case affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not established irreparable harm, id. at 981-82, and the panel did not
discuss the merits of Google’s fair use defense. Given the apparent strength of Google’s fair
use argument, the decision is a bit of a lost opportunity to confirm Google’s reliance on fair
use in administering its ubiquitous Image Search service. Nonetheless, a discretionary
approach to rights/remedy sequencing likely does help cabin split-the-baby incentives.
The panel’s approach did not lead to any substantive expansions, given that the district
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument on the merits. It is important to note, however, that to
the extent that future appeals present a split-the-baby decision in the lower court, an
affirmance solely on the lack of irreparable harm could leave questionable district court
rulings on the merits intact.
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actors. Salinger appears to adapt eBay’s efficiency concerns in the
patent system to the First Amendment concerns in the copyright
system, but the ultimate result is that the Salinger test couches a
shift to a liability rule in a commitment to robust freedoms for
speech and expression.
C. Splitting the Baby
Although the eBay standard is still slowly weaving its way into
copyright law,193 Salinger is neither the only, nor the first,194
decision to take the opportunity to split the baby by ruling favorably
for the copyright holder at step one but ruling in defendant’s favor
at steps two through four and denying the injunction. The sample
size remains admittedly small—suggesting that eBay and Salinger
may not have revolutionized the adjudication of copyright injunctions195— but when faced with difficult questions of fair use or novel
questions posed by digital media, the decisions herein lean heavily
on the eBay/Salinger standard in order to split the baby and, at
least provisionally, resolve these questions in favor of the rights
193. For example, the Ninth Circuit has only just recently held that eBay alters its
traditional approach to copyright preliminary injunctions. See Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1713 (2012);
Perfect 10, 653 F.3d at 981. The Perfect 10 litigation is a good example of the interplay
between fair use determinations and the availability of injunctive relief. In the initial
preliminary injunction ruling, the district court rejected Google’s argument that its Image
Search thumbnails were a fair use of Perfect 10’s images, concluding they could interfere with
the market for small, low-resolution adult images on mobile devices. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s
presumption of irreparable harm, a preliminary injunction followed. Id. at 859. The district
court did not preliminarily enjoin Image Search, however, but instead proposed a much more
limited injunction requiring Google to implement a notice-and-takedown process for excluding
Perfect 10 images. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 70, at 801-02. “In adopting such a limited
remedy, the court effectively removed much of the sting from its liability ruling.” Id. at 802.
194. In Tasini, the Court concluded that the inclusion of freelance newspaper articles in
online databases was infringing, but it at least arguably split the baby by declaring that an
injunction need not follow. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001) (“Agreeing with
the Court of Appeals that the Publishers are liable for infringement, we leave remedial issues
open for initial airing and decision in the District Court.”).
195. For instance, Jiarui Lui in his empirical study of copyright injunctions after eBay
found little change in the rate of denying injunctions in copyright cases. See Liu, supra note
165, at 227-29. Liu’s study, however, was admittedly limited to the time period ending June
2010, only a few months after Salinger was released. Id. at 228.
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holder.196 The cases in this Section demonstrate how remedial talk
can be deployed in a manner at odds with the motivations of remedy
reformers, and they also serve as a cautionary tale for attempting
to do transformational copyright advocacy through remedies reform,
at least as typically framed.
In Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., the tattoo artist
behind Mike Tyson’s distinctive facial tattoo sought to preliminarily
enjoin the release of The Hangover Part II because it featured a
nearly identical facial tattoo on the actor Ed Helms following his
character’s drunken evening in Bangkok, Thailand.197 Mike Tyson—
and the tattoo on his face—appeared in the first The Hangover film,
and there appeared to be a fairly strong argument that the use of
the tattoo in the sequel was a comedic reference to the first film,
poking fun at Tyson and the arguably ridiculous design permanently emblazoned across his face. Nonetheless, the district court
determined that Warner Brothers was unlikely to succeed on its fair
use defense. According to the court, “This use of the tattoo did not
comment on the artist’s work or have any critical bearing on the
original composition.... Any other facial tattoo would have worked
as well to serve the plot device.”198 It then proceeded, however, to
adopt the eBay standard and deny the requested injunction: “[A]fter
eBay and Winter, there is no presumption that simply because there
is a finding of likelihood of success on copyright infringement, or
even a finding of actual copyright infringement[,] that there must
be an injunction.”199 Although the plaintiff established irreparable
harm through a loss of control over his work, the court found that
Warner Brothers and third-party distributors stood to lose tremen196. Another example of this split-the-baby dynamic occurred shortly before this Article
went to press. In Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., No. CV 12-04529 DMG, 2012 WL
5938563, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012), the district court denied Fox’s motion for a
preliminary injunction due to a lack of irreparable harm. Nonetheless, in its discussion of the
merits, the court concluded that the creation of a Quality Assurance copy of the plaintiff’s
programs was not fair use, even though the QA copy was never directly presented to the endusers and the commercial-skipping end product it facilitated was itself deemed a fair use. Id.
at *14 (“The fact that consumers ultimately use AutoHop in conjunction with PTAT for
private home use, a fair use under Sony, does not render the intermediate copies themselves
a fair use as well.”).
197. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-752 (E.D. Mo. May 24, 2011), Doc. No. 56.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id. at 5.
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dous amounts of money if the film’s release were blocked, making an
injunction inappropriate under the third and fourth steps.200 As in
Salinger, the disaggregation of infringement from injunction
allowed the court to reject a fairly strong assertion of fair use without seemingly offending free speech interests, and tensions between
the two halves of the ruling are rendered unproblematic by the
rights essentialism employed by the court.
In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., the district court similarly
used the eBay/Salinger standard to deny an injunction to the rights
holder while signaling the rights holder’s likelihood of success on a
problematic infringement claim.201 Defendant’s cloud-based service
allowed users to “resell” a music file in a manner approximating the
resale of physical media, wherein the seller could no longer access
the file upon completion of the transaction.202 Commentators and
amici accordingly noted that the case raised fundamental questions
about the applicability of the first-sale doctrine in the digital
context, with broad implications for the cloud computing industry.203
Citing the eBay standard, the court denied plaintiff’s requested
preliminary injunction due to lack of irreparable harm, reasoning
that plaintiff’s careful recordkeeping would reasonably permit a
calculation of damages.204 The court announced, however, that
“likelihood of success on the merits is something that plaintiffs have

200. Id. at 6-7.
201. Transcript of Bench Ruling at 3-5, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12 CV 95
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Bench Ruling], available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/85183018/Redigi-Bench-Ruling-on-Preliminary-Injunction.
202. Michael B. Farrell, The Used Record Store Goes Digital, BOS. GLOBE, July 2, 2012,
available at 2012 WLNR 16218658.
203. See, e.g., Letter from Fenwick & West LLP, on Behalf of Google, to Judge Sullivan
(Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://beckermanlegal.com/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/
capitol_ redigi_120201GoogleLetterReAmicusBrief.pdf (“The Court can and should deny the
motion for preliminary injunction without reaching the complex and profound legal issues
outlined above because any decision should be informed by the fullest presentation of the
relevant facts and law rather than at a preliminary injunction stage. A premature decision
on incomplete facts could create unintended uncertainties for the cloud computing industry.”);
James Grimmelman, ReDigi and the Purpose of First Sale, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 8, 2012, 3:21
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/02/redigi-and-the-purpose-of-first-sale.
html (“What I love about this case is that it pushes and pulls our intuitions about copyright
in so many different directions. It brings up fundamental questions not just about unsettled
corners of doctrine, but also about what copyright is for.”).
204. Bench Ruling, supra note 201, at 3.

1172

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1123

demonstrated.”205 Although Judge Sullivan cautioned that he was
not finding that plaintiffs “would win,” he noted that “there are
arguments that on their face look to be compelling or potentially
persuasive arguments. They have certainly done a good job of
articulating those based on the statute, which I think covers that
element.”206 He provided no analysis, however, of why defendant’s
countervailing first-sale and fair use arguments were unlikely to
prevail. The case may ultimately produce a final decision on the
merits, but, until then or if the parties settle, Judge Sullivan’s
provisional rejection is the sole guidance on the important questions
raised.
Although the case primarily involved a claim of trademark
infringement, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in North American
Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. presents another example
of the eBay standard underwriting essentialist, split-the-baby
adjudication.207 The court in North American Medical vacated a
preliminary injunction against defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark
because the district court relied on the court’s pre-eBay presumption
of irreparable harm.208 It upheld, however, the lower court’s very
questionable likelihood-of-confusion analysis. The court found
“actual source confusion” because defendant used plaintiff’s mark as
a descriptive metatag for its website, and defendant’s website
appeared second in the Google search results for that mark.209 This
finding was based on a considerable misunderstanding of contemporary search engines, which make little if any use of metatags in
determining search relevancy.210 The Eleventh Circuit was able to
cabin the consequences of the district court’s highly questionable
ruling by invoking the eBay standard, but it did so in a manner
signaling liability for a fairly trivial—if not irrelevant—use of a
plaintiff’s mark.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
207. 522 F.3d 1211, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2008).
208. Id. at 1228.
209. Id. at 1223.
210. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1146
n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Modern search engines such as Google no longer use metatags. Instead
they rely on their own algorithms to find websites.”); Eric Goldman, 11th Circuit Freaks Out
About Metatags, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/11th_circuit_fr.htm.
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Limitations on injunctive relief were ostensibly intended to
provide better procedural safeguards for socially valuable expression. In the above cases, however, such limitations appear to have
shifted the balancing of free speech and public interests away from
the merits determination and into the remedy stages, both lowering
the costs of finding infringement and seemingly isolating the merits
question at the initial, threshold step. The merits and remedies
determinations in Salinger, Whitmill, ReDigi, and North American
Medical are closely intertwined, but their conceptual disaggregation
and a shift in focus to the remedies determination leaves largely
unquestioned the questionable predicate determinations of infringement produced by the rights/remedy interplay.
V. WHAT IS THE HARM?
Looking at the rights/remedies relationship through the critical
lens of remedial and performative theories reveals two types of
troubling drawbacks to the essentialist approach to remedies
employed by eBay, Salinger, and their progeny. The cases surveyed
in the previous Section—and to a significant extent the scholarship
surveyed in Part I—have overlooked the ways in which the framing
of copyright remedy reform has the potential to (1) exacerbate
distributional consequences of splitting the baby and (2) mask the
realignment and reinforcement of industrial copyright norms.
A. Distributional Consequences and Chilling Effects
Although the narrowing of injunctive relief may lead to an
expansion of substantive copyright protection, as documented above
there are some merits to the eBay and Salinger standards’ shift
toward a liability rule. Even though the split-the-baby dynamic
described above suggests that the shift might be more appropriately
characterized as a shift from a relatively weak property rule to a
strong liability rule, many of the well-documented advantages of a
liability rule would still likely attach under this regime. Large-scale
digitization projects could proceed without the need to obtain ex
ante permission from every rights holder,211 multi-million-dollar
211. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 160, at 430-31 (noting that a liability rule might help

1174

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1123

movie productions could proceed on schedule, and publications like
those in the two Salinger cases would not be subject to the veto of
unhappy rights holders. For the parties likely involved in these
productions and the related licensing transactions, eBay and
Salinger are certainly appealing.
There are nonetheless a number of reasons to be troubled by the
shift to a liability rule accompanied by an expansion of substantive
entitlements. This shift might be welcomed by Hollywood, the
publishing industries, and certain large technology companies, but
it threatens to burden individuals, nonprofits, documentary and
independent filmmakers, and other authors who lack the financial
resources to clear the rights for their creative endeavors.212 Levinson
has suggested that “remedies sometimes create a case-selection
effect that in turn may influence the development and content of
rights,”213 and to the extent that copyright’s remedial structure
furthers primarily the interests of those with the financial means to
litigate, the doctrine that emerges will similarly reflect those interests. The results in each of the cases may ultimately be satisfactory
for the respective parties—Whitmill could easily be compensated by
a deep-pockets movie studio and Colting could perhaps share some
of his proceeds with the Salinger estate214—but copyright law
nonetheless casts a long shadow over nonindustrial endeavors.215
Particularly given how prominently First Amendment and democratic concerns have factored into remedy reform proposals, the
distributional consequences, rights-holder overreach, and moral
implications of split-the-baby adjudications caution against a
reflexive embrace of eBay and Salinger.
First, by expanding the range of infringing activity and, correspondingly, the circumstances requiring a copyright license, the
solve orphan works problems).
212. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION
IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5-6 (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/
policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
213. Levinson, supra note 91, at 912.
214. Indeed, both cases settled fairly soon after the courts’ decisions. See Matthew Belloni,
Warner Bros. Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD ESQ. (June 20,
2011, 1:39 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii203377; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1918-21 (2007) (describing the widespread university classroom
clearance customs that emerged from one settlement and one district court opinion).
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dynamic described above may further exacerbate wealth-based
speech disparities. In many cases, such a quasi-compulsory license
regime approximated by a strong liability rule could put an end to
nonprofit or noncommercial expression just as effectively as a courtordered injunction.216 For example, requiring documentary filmmakers,217 vidders,218 or fan fiction writers219 to pay a “compulsory fee”
to reimagine copyrighted works creates a risk of chilling a significant amount of this work.220 Moreover, to the extent that a liability
rule renders private licensing more efficient, and thus more customary, “clearance culture” norms can feed back into the determination of fair use and ultimately restrict the scope of the doctrine.221 To
216. For example, the imposition of a compulsory license on webcasters under the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recording Act put at least two hundred webcasters out of
business within two weeks of the Librarian of Congress’s final order. Matthew J. Astle, Will
Congress Kill the Podcasting Star?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 177-78 (2005); see also
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE (2011) (providing many
examples of license fees chilling creative endeavors).
217. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 17-22 (2004), available at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
218. See Tushnet, supra note 186, at 2135, 2154-55 (explaining how vidders benefit from
fair use).
219. See, e.g., Stacey M. Lantagne, The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True
and Logical Precedent, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 159, 171 (2011) (“Salinger is not an
ideal fanfiction precedent.”).
220. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View
of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 368 (2004) (arguing that conditioning lowprofit but socially valuable and self-enriching endeavors on the ability to pay “can lead to
distortions that offend our norms of individual equality”); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, What
Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 384 (2005) (“While firms that produce content could easily carry the
transaction costs involved in securing a license, high legal costs create a barrier on innovation
by individuals.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 589 (2004) (“Yet poor people also have
interests in self-expression and persuasion.... [I]f wealth controlled access to foundational
elements of speech, that protection would no longer exist.”); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling,
Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1566 (2005) (“[I]terative creativity
could be stifled by the mere expense of seeking and paying for permission to incorporate
copyrighted expression into a new work.”).
221. See Gibson, supra note 70, at 884-85; Rothman, supra note 215, at 1958 (“The
clearance culture is ... driven by big players—both owners and users—for whom licensing fees
are much cheaper than the potential litigation down the road. Less well-financed users of IP
cannot always afford licensing fees and therefore must rely on fair use and other defenses to
infringement.”); cf. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 288 (2007) (“Fair use deems lawful some uses that yield benefits to third parties, not
because the transaction costs between the copyright owner and user are necessarily high, but
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the extent that eBay and Salinger serve to facilitate industrial
copyright licensing at the expense of fair use, they also serve to shift
creative resources away from smaller-scale users of intellectual
property.222
Second, this expansion of substantive copyright entitlement and
contraction of fair use facilitates continued overreach by industrial
content owners. A tremendous number of copyright disputes are
resolved not through litigation or negotiation, but instead through
sending takedown notices to internet service providers and websites
that rights holders believe in “good faith” to be hosting infringing
content.223 Copyright owners have stretched this “good faith” requirement quite far,224 and some estimate that roughly one-third of
DMCA takedown notices stand on shaky legal ground.225 Although
§ 512(f) provides a cause of action for rights-holder “misrepresentations” within a takedown notice, copyright holders generally are
able to represent “gray” cases of fair use as clear infringement.226 To
the extent that eBay and Salinger lead to a contraction in fair use,
they expand this gray area of infringement so as to subject a wider
range of uses to “good faith” takedown requests.227 If one of the
rather to sustain the flow of spillovers to third parties.”).
222. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law, and Public Policy: The INS Case as an
Example for Intellectual Property, 78 VA. L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1992) (expressing concern that
“the better financed private interest” will be served through reliance on custom). But see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual
Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1579-87 (2010) (supporting the use of custom to determine
reasonableness in common law intellectual property adjudication).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006); see, e.g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER
ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69-71 (2011) (describing “[o]verreaching by copyright
owners” in utilizing DMCA takedown notices).
224. See, e.g., Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 178 (2010) (“[T]he
DMCA makes it too easy for inappropriate claims of copyright to produce takedown of speech.
It encourages service providers to take down speech on notice even if the notice is factually
questionable or flawed.”).
225. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 666 (2006) (finding that at least a third of DMCA
notices contained “substantial legal questions related to the underlying copyright claim” or
“significant technical noncompliance” with the statute).
226. Ira S. Nathenson, Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and User-Generated Content,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 911, 921 (2010); see Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d
1000, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that only “knowing” misrepresentations are actionable).
227. See Nathenson, supra note 226, at 918-19 (arguing that through a “substanceprocedure-substance feedback loop ... [t]he de facto scope of copyright can become extended
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major impetuses for narrowing the availability of preliminary
injunctions is a concern with prior restraint of lawful speech,228 a
doctrinal shift that will further underwrite extrajudicial censorship
of a wide range of noninfringing content should be particularly
troubling.229
Third, requiring compensation for an ever-expanding range of
uses subverts many of the ideological and moral commitments
underlying much of the scholarship in this area. As Diane
Zimmerman has observed, “The idea of a metered public domain ...
is intuitively uncomfortable, and I suspect quite alien to the understanding that animates the work of most scholars in the field.”230
For example, Edwin Baker has argued that “speech freedom is a
liberty—not a market—right. Freedom of speech gives a person a
right to say what she wants. It does not give the person a right to
charge a price for the opportunity to hear or receive her speech.”231
In a slightly different vein, Jennifer Rothman argues that requiring
payment for expressive uses of copyrighted works is in tension with
the significant personal meaning that engagement with copyrighted
works can carry, and that it can interfere with the liberty-enhancing
benefits of such engagement.232 Julie Cohen further suggests that “a
compensation requirement might have the perverse effect of suppressing those retellings that map most closely to the dissent
trope.”233 If an author’s reinterpretation of a popular work were
driven by some critical perspective on that work, guaranteeing
financial enrichment to the object of that critique might seriously
degrade and/or dissuade the author’s critical/creative endeavor.234
Lastly, even if the earlier author would be entitled to financially
benefit from a wider swath of subsequent uses, the shift from a
property rule to a liability rule could excessively commodify and
far beyond the scope of what de jure copyright law permits”).
228. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 197-98.
229. See Seltzer, supra note 224, at 190 (“The takedowns resulting from DMCA
notifications bear many of the hallmarks of prior restraints on speech.”).
230. Zimmerman, supra note 220, at 367.
231. Baker, supra note 5, at 903.
232. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 463, 528-29 (2010).
233. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1202 (2007).
234. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 73, at 331 (arguing that a shift from fair use to
allocation of profits could “squelch” a book “as effectively as any district court order”).
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devalue the emotional investment of the author in the initial
work.235
B. Lack of Transparency
Regardless of whether one views the harms outlined above as
outweighing the potential benefits of the eBay/Salinger standard, it
is nonetheless troubling that the shift toward a strong liability rule
does not seem to be the product of careful, transparent deliberation
about the advantages and disadvantages of such a regime. The
Salinger court discussed at length how concerns with the First
Amendment should be incorporated into steps two through four of
the preliminary injunction inquiry, but it affirmed the district
court’s fair use analysis in a single paragraph without any mention
of the serious First Amendment issues implicated by that decision.236 It reduced the district court’s fair use analysis to essentially a credibility determination, subject to “clear error” review.237
235. For example, Wendy Gordon has expressed concern that a greater shift toward
monetary remedies could “constrict” the ways that authors see their works:
The more the law pushes authors toward seeing their work in a cash-only nexus,
the more danger it poses of devaluing the work in the artists’ own minds.
Common observation suggests that intrinsic motivations tend to produce better
work, at least in the highly skilled vocations, than extrinsic motivations. But
extrinsic motives could increasingly displace intrinsic ones if an author is
entitled only to a sum of money.
Gordon, supra note 75, at 88 (footnote omitted); see also Robert P. Merges, The Concept of
Property in the Digital Era, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1271 (2008) (“Here is a thought: for some
creators, it is more important to maintain the integrity of their work than to command a high
price.”).
236. A useful comparison is the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to a very similar set of
procedural and substantive issues in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2001). In that case, the district court had preliminarily enjoined the release of Alice
Walker’s novel The Wind Done Gone, a retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s classic novel Gone with
the Wind, largely from the perspective of the novel’s black characters. Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1385-86 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257.
The district court had found defendants unlikely to succeed on their fair use defense,
presumed the existence of irreparable harm, and found that the balance of harms and public
interest weighed in favor of an injunction. See id. at 1370-85. Although the Eleventh Circuit
did reject the district court’s irreparable harm analysis, it carefully and extensively addressed
the viability of the fair use defense and repeatedly emphasized that the fair use doctrine
mediated First Amendment conflicts raised by copyright claims. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at
1260-77. In ultimately concluding that Walker’s novel was fair use, the court recognized the
important speech and expression issues at stake in its fair use analysis. Id. at 1276-77.
237. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
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It then summarily concluded that this determination combined with
“all the other facts in this case”—whatever they may be—supported
a denial of fair use.238 Instead of grappling with the issues of public
access, creative incentives, competition, and free speech embedded
within the fair use doctrine, eBay and Salinger allow courts to give
each side a little bit of what they want, facilitate settlement,239 and
tip their hats to the First Amendment. Because the question of
infringement—with subsidiary determinations of copyrightability,
substantial similarity, and fair use—is no longer the end-all and beall of a request for an injunction and is instead just the first of
several steps, courts no longer need to vindicate speech/expression
interests through the resolution of difficult questions of fair use;
instead, they can just skim over the merits and seemingly achieve
the same ends by denying injunctive relief. The Salinger panel did
not need to give more than cursory attention to the fair use issue in
order to vacate the district court’s order, but in so doing it effected
a significant limitation on the rights of authors to critically engage
with and reinterpret important cultural texts.
It would be one thing if the courts actually believed that the
conduct in question, divorced from remedial considerations, represented clear instances of infringement. The rights/remedy distinction, however, makes it extremely difficult to know what concerns
in fact motivated the result in the cases surveyed above. Douglas
Laycock has observed that heavy reliance on equitable considerations, in particular the requirement of irreparable harm, can mask
a court’s actual motivations and shield the underlying normative
position behind a legal decision.240 “[W]henever a court cites the
irreparable injury rule and denies the remedy that plaintiff seeks,
there is some other reason for the decision—the operative rule or
the real reason.”241 Salinger expressed concerns for the free speech
interests of the parties and the public in a manner entirely divorced
from its discussion of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, but, looking
238. Id.
239. A rich body of scholarship has discussed the merits and drawbacks of courts
encouraging settlement. See, most prominently, Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073 (1984) (discussing the potential imbalances of power in the settlement process and
the injustices that may arise by sidestepping trial and judgment).
240. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990).
241. Id. at 726-27.
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at the case itself, it is impossible to know what concerns, if any,
influenced the court’s views on the merits. Even though rights and
remedies are “inextricably intertwined,”242 Salinger “retroactively
installed” a plaintiff’s rights as prior to remedial considerations and
cleaved policy issues out of the discussion of rights, cutting off any
“direct access” to the normative thrust of the opinion.243 Because this
sharp conceptual distinction between rights and remedies forecloses
direct access to the normative underpinnings of the rights determination, it is incredibly difficult to assess the ideological and jurisprudential significance of Salinger. It is far from clear (1) whether
Salinger is a First Amendment victory whose specific facts happened to militate against fair use or (2) whether the panel’s preference for a strong liability rule and its attendant transactional
efficiencies embraced a split-the-baby compromise as a means
toward this end.
Looking at the Salinger standard, however, through the lens of
performativity rather than through an essentialist rights/remedy
distinction can potentially expose the cooperation of copyright law
and market ideologies.244 In deciding whether to enjoin some particular conduct, a court may not be merely responding to some
potential failure in the market for copyrighted works; it may instead
be producing the market-based structures that appear to have
prefigured the dispute. In vacating the preliminary injunction
in Salinger, the Second Circuit repeatedly invoked the First
Amendment and the importance of considering the expressive
interests of the parties as well as the public at large; despite this
invocation, however, the decision as a whole shifts copyright law in
a manner that further entrenches a belief that copyright holders are
entitled to compensation for a vast range of downstream uses.245 To
those who have advocated limitations on injunctive relief based on
a commitment to nonindustrial and/or noneconomic creative values,
the potential adaptation of such proposals to reify transactional
copyright norms should be troubling. A performative approach to
remedies at the very least unearths the dynamism and slipperiness
242. Levinson, supra note 91, at 858.
243. BUTLER, supra note 137, at 5.
244. See Birla, supra note 143, at 93 (highlighting the importance of considering “the
performatives of law in its production of the market as sovereign”).
245. See supra Part IV.B.
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of the rights/remedy relationship as an object of inquiry and
potential concern.
Performative theory further demonstrates the role of temporal
sequencing in this reinforcement of status quo norms. As explained
above, the “success” of a performative is in large part attributable
to a temporal inversion, whereby it installs a phenomenon as
existing prior to social interpretation. This temporal inversion is
characteristic of the “two-step process” of rights essentialism which,
according to Levinson, “legitimate[s] and protects” the privileged
status of rights and obscures the way in which the iteration of
remedies shapes substantive constitutional values.246 This same
two-part sequence—addressing the merits of an infringement claim
and then deciding what remedy should or should not follow—has
pervaded copyright scholarship and recent case law. By according
first-order consideration to merits determinations and relegating
the question of remedies to secondary status—whereby it attempts
to enhance, diminish, or cure the consequences of the first-order
decision—this sequential approach masks the normative significance of the remedial determination. By positing a robust entitlement determination as occurring first-in-time and in isolation from
pragmatic considerations, the Salinger sequence naturalizes and
normalizes a baseline right to control and/or receive compensation
for the use of a copyrighted work.
Lastly, the idea that eBay and Salinger provide courts with
greater flexibility or wider discretion insufficiently accounts for the
role of such flexible remedies in shaping rights and fails to dislodge
status quo economic norms from the construction of both rights and
remedies.247 Flexibility and fluidity may ease some of the constraints
of the current system or “cure” some of the harshest consequences
of a court finding infringement,248 but greater freedom given a
particular determination of infringement nonetheless “upholds and
sustains” the assumptions and values that give rise to that baseline
finding.249 The entire discussions of injunctive relief in eBay and
246. See Levinson, supra note 91, at 857, 924.
247. See Afori, supra note 66, at 2-3; Kamin, supra note 116, at 5-8; see also Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Flexibility is a
hallmark of equity jurisdiction.”).
248. Afori, supra note 66, at 23-24.
249. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 147, at 18-19 (discussing how flexibility in terms of

1182

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1123

Salinger are predicated upon an infringing act, and it is important
to remember that both decisions’ discussions of speech, competition,
and the public interest operate off this baseline assumption.
Flexibility at the remedies stage provides defendants greater
freedom to continue their creative efforts notwithstanding the label
of infringer, but grounding flexibility in that label conditions
remedial freedom on at least temporary concession of that label’s
validity. Because freedom from the consequences of being named an
infringer requires acceding to the existence of infringement, the
linear rights Æ remedies sequence forecloses contesting infringement while simultaneously harnessing the liberatory promise of
remedy reform. Broader equitable discretion can make the copyright
system seem fairer and less explicitly speech inhibitory, but it does
so without fundamentally reshaping the status quo values of that
system.250 Remedies—viewed as outgrowths of baseline rights—may
be reformed by eBay and Salinger, but these decisions disaggregate
rights and remedies in a manner that both obscures the performative role of remedies251 and maintains a robust system of copyright
entitlements.
CONCLUSION
Halberstam has warned that “we have become adept within
postmodernism at talking about ‘normativity,’ but far less adept at
describing in rich detail the practices and structures that both
oppose and sustain conventional forms of association, belonging,
and identification.”252 Copyright scholarship is filled with beautifully
diverse articulations of alternative models of creativity, collaboration, and public discourse, but it is important to be sensitive to the
sexual politics “upholds and sustains” heteronormative assumptions); Dinshaw et al., supra
note 144, at 190-91 (describing flexibility as a “temporal” construct).
250. Accordingly, Reva Siegel’s idea of “preservation through transformation”—whereby
a particular status regime evolves different means of enforcement over time—may be a useful
framework through which to understand the consequences of eBay and Salinger. See Reva B.
Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119
(1996).
251. For a similar argument in the sex discrimination context, see Katherine M. Franke,
The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1995).
252. HALBERSTAM, supra note 147, at 4.
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conventional practices, procedures, and conceptual framings that
serve to subtly, but effectively, entrench copyright’s current
ideological commitments.
The primary purpose of this Article has been to demonstrate the
limits of using remedies to protect interests in speech and expression against the expansions of copyright law. I am not arguing that
eBay or Salinger were wrong to prohibit categorical rules favoring
injunctive relief; there are good reasons to require courts to keep in
mind the traditional equitable factors before taking the drastic step
of issuing an injunction. It is important, however, that courts and
scholars recognize the potential consequences of advocating and
embracing the standard embodied by eBay and Salinger. These
cases deal with a particular set of litigants whose interests may be
adequately served by the split-the-baby outcomes facilitated by the
eBay/Salinger standard; but for the broader public operating in the
shadow of copyright law, a court’s finding of infringement may be
deeply problematic.
Given the relative novelty of Salinger and the application of the
eBay standard to copyright law, the ideas explored in this Article
can only be provisional. Nonetheless, viewing the deployment of the
four-part test through the lens of remedial and performative
theories suggests a far more dynamic relationship between rights
and remedies than copyright law and scholarship have generally
acknowledged. Not only do these theories suggest an interrelationship between rights and remedies, but they also reveal a deep
intertwinement between the underlying normative aims of our
copyright system and the adjudicative sequences that further them.

